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Articles 
SANCTUARIES AS EQUITABLE DELEGATION IN 
AN ERA OF MASS IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 
Jason A. Cade 
ABSTRACT—Opponents of—and sometimes advocates for—sanctuary 
policies describe them as obstructions to the operation of federal 
immigration law. This premise is flawed. On the better view, the sanctuary 
movement comports with, rather than fights against, dominant new themes 
in federal immigration law. A key theme—emerging both in judicial 
doctrine and on-the-ground practice—focuses on maintaining legitimacy by 
fostering adherence to equitable norms in enforcement decision-making 
processes. Against this backdrop, the sanctuary efforts of cities, churches, 
and campuses are best seen as measures necessary to inject normative (and 
sometimes legal) accuracy into real-world immigration enforcement 
decision-making. Sanctuaries can erect front-line equitable screens, 
promote procedural fairness, and act as last-resort circuit breakers in the 
administration of federal deportation law. The dynamics are messy and 
contested, but these efforts in the long run help ensure the vindication of 
equity-based legitimacy norms in immigration enforcement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Jeanette Vizguerra, an undocumented immigrant from Mexico, has 
been living in the United States since 1997 and has three U.S. citizen 
children.1 A traffic stop led to the issuance of a deportation order against 
her in 2011. She was able, however, to obtain stays of removal from 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), allowing her to remain in 
the United States on a temporary basis. Because Vizguerra was the victim 
of a serious crime and helpful to law enforcement in pursuing the 
perpetrator, she obtained a certification from law enforcement that made 
her eligible for “U status,” a statutory dispensation that puts certain crime 
 
 1 Donie O’Sullivan & Sara Weisfeldt, Undocumented Mom Taking Sanctuary in Denver Church Is 
Among Time’s 100 Most Influential People, CNN (Apr. 20, 2017, 2:05 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/us/vizguerra-time-100-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/F3M7-
GRFX]. 
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victims on a pathway to lawful immigration status. Nevertheless, on 
February 15, 2017, less than one month after President Trump’s 
inauguration, ICE declined any further stay. It took this action 
notwithstanding Vizguerra’s pending U application, two decades of 
productive residence, and the far-reaching harm her removal would have on 
her dependent U.S. citizen children. Vizguerra’s congregation immediately 
offered her sanctuary, physically sheltering her from removal.2 She lived in 
the church building for three months while negotiations for leniency 
continued on her behalf.3 Eventually, ICE capitulated, agreeing to extend 
her stay of removal until March 15, 2019, thus allowing her to remain with 
her family while awaiting agency adjudication of her U application.4 
Vizguerra’s precarious situation is not unique. Across the United 
States, immigration enforcement in 2017 took a sharp turn in a less 
nuanced and more draconian direction. Few deportable noncitizens now 
can expect to benefit from favorable enforcement discretion, even if they 
lack a criminal record and have made positive contributions to their 
community, or if their removal would cause substantial suffering to 
themselves or their families.5 Taxpaying breadwinners who have lived in 
the country for decades have suddenly found themselves detained far from 
family.6 Noncitizen survivors of domestic violence seeking protective 
 
 2 See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to Field Officer Dirs. et al., ICE, Enforcement 
Actions at or Focused on Sensitive Locations (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ero-
outreach/pdf/10029.2-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J96-TLGL] (indicating that as a policy matter ICE 
will not enforce immigration law in “sensitive locations” such as churches). 
 3 Melissa Etehad, Denver Mother Is Granted Temporary Deportation Relief After 3 Months of 
Sanctuary in a Church, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2017, 3:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
na-denver-mother-relief-20170512-story.html [https://perma.cc/8J96-TLGL] (describing efforts by 
politicians and her congregation to obtain a reprieve from ICE). 
 4 Id. Due to a 10,000 per year cap on U visas, there is currently a multi-year backlog in processing. 
8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2)(A) (2012); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., NO. OF FORM I-918, 




 5 See generally Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 
89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 9–13 (2014) (discussing the statutory grounds that make noncitizens deportable for a 
wide range of immigration violations and crimes, with little opportunity for formal discretionary relief). 
 6 See, e.g., Liz Robbins, Once Routine, Immigration Check-Ins Are Now High Stakes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/nyregion/ice-immigration-check-in-
deportation.html [https://perma.cc/67G9-69D2]; Tracy Seipel, Deported: End of the Line for 
Undocumented Oakland Couple, MERCURY NEWS (published Aug. 16, 2017, 4:39 PM; updated Mar. 
29, 2018, 12:03 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/08/16/deported-end-of-the-line-for-
undocumented-oakland-couple [https://perma.cc/9DAE-P7BJ] (reporting on ICE’s refusal to exercise 
favorable discretion in the case of a Mexican couple without criminal records deported after living in 
the U.S. for over two decades, working in construction and nursing, paying taxes, and raising four 
children, now in high school and college). 
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orders, as well as immigrant parents in child support or custody disputes, 
have been arrested by ICE just outside the courtroom door.7 Noncitizens 
arrested for minor offenses have been put in removal proceedings even 
before they have had an opportunity to contest the criminal charges.8 Even 
immigrants with clear paths to lawful status are routinely detained.9 In 
2017, immigration arrests of noncitizens without criminal histories more 
than doubled, while immigration arrests generally rose by 42%.10 
What precipitated this dire situation for noncitizens? In short, a 
changing of the guard. When the Trump Administration came to power 
early in 2017, it quickly made every potentially deportable noncitizen a 
removal priority.11 In sharp contrast to the efforts of prior administrations, 
the new Administration abandoned the premise of equitable prosecutorial 
discretion.12 The Administration trumpets this blanket, indiscriminate 
 
 7 See, e.g., Jonathan Blitzer, The Trump Era Tests the True Power of Sanctuary Cities, NEW 
YORKER (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-trump-era-tests-the-true-
power-of-sanctuary-cities [https://perma.cc/L9QA-5XUG]; Nora Caplan-Bricker, “I Wish I’d Never 
Called the Police,” SLATE (Mar. 19, 2017, 8:12 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/cover_story/2017/03/u_visas_gave_a_safe_path_to_ci
tizenship_to_victims_of_abuse_under_trump.html [https://perma.cc/QMQ5-96UU]; Jennifer Medina, 
Too Scared to Report Sexual Abuse. The Fear: Deportation., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/us/immigrants-deportation-sexual-abuse.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z9MP-AEKE]. 
 8 Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8,793, 8,793–94 (Jan. 30, 2017) (“It is the policy of the executive branch to . . . detain individuals 
apprehended on suspicion of violating Federal or State law . . . .”); Maria Sacchetti, ICE Immigration 
Arrests of Noncriminals Double Under Trump, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration-arrests-of-noncriminals-double-under-
trump/2017/04/16/98a2f1e2-2096-11e7-be2a-3a1fb24d4671_story.html [https://perma.cc/724F-9TDS] 
(documenting 75% rise in number of detainer requests ICE sought for arrested noncitizens); 
Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Enforcement of the Immigrant Laws to Serve the 
National Interest (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-
Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEX8-5DDT] [hereinafter Kelly, Priorities 
Memo] (expanding immigration priorities to include noncitizens who have been arrested but not yet 
convicted). 
 9 See, e.g., Maria Cramer, ICE Arrested 7 People as They Sought Permanent Status in Mass., R.I., 
BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/02/21/january-ice-arrested-
people-they-sought-permanent-status-mass-and-rhode-island/EE4jLM6HkytwrHDUjYpdqL/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/AD5W-23EB]. 
 10 ICE, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 2–3, 5 (2017), 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QF7-QVSS]. 
 11 See Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13,767, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8,793; Kelly, Priorities Memo, supra note 8. 
 12 See infra Part II. 
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approach to enforcement as a “return to [the] rule of law.”13 As then-
Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly put it, “[i]f you’re here 
illegally, you should leave or you should be deported, put through the 
system.”14 In December 2017, Acting Director of ICE Thomas Homan 
affirmed the Administration’s continued commitment to this approach: 
“There’s no population off the table. If you’re in this country illegally, 
we’re looking for you and we’re going to look to apprehend you.”15 
In the face of this mass, indiscriminate federal enforcement, sites of 
resistance have risen throughout the country. Hundreds of jurisdictions 
have passed or strengthened so-called “sanctuary” policies, which limit 
local government employees’ cooperation in the federal immigration 
enforcement process and in some cases provide services to potentially 
deportable noncitizens.16 Religious organizations, too, have taken up this 
cause, gaining visibility as institutions willing to shelter and assist 
individuals caught up by harsh deportation policies.17 Sanctuary 
campuses—public or private institutions of higher education with policies 
limiting cooperation or information-sharing with federal immigration 
authorities—are also on the rise.18 
Critics charge that sanctuary policies present a threat to law and order, 
unlawfully obstruct enforcement, endanger the public, protect lawbreakers, 
and encourage further immigration violations.19 One of President Trump’s 
 
 13 Press Release No. 17-889, Dep’t of Justice, Return to Rule of Law in Trump Administration 
Marked by Increase in Key Immigration Statistics (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
return-rule-law-trump-administration-marked-increase-key-immigration-statistics [https://perma.cc/ 
LM2C-PYAP]. 
 14 Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-
press/meet-press-april-16-2017-n747116 [https://perma.cc/9K7U-N8Z8]. On July 31, 2017, John Kelly 
was appointed Chief of Staff to the Trump Administration, vacating his position as DHS Secretary, 
which he had held since January 20, 2017. Dan Merica, Kelly Sworn In as Trump’s Second Chief of 
Staff, CNN (July 31, 2017, 10:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/31/politics/john-kelly-chief-of-
staff/index.html [https://perma.cc/NU6N-7ZUQ]. 
 15 Adam K. Raymond, Deportations Are Down Under Trump, but Arrests of Non-Criminal 
Immigrants Surge, N.Y. MAG: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 20, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/ 
intelligencer/2017/12/deportations-are-down-as-immigration-arrests-surge.html [https://perma.cc/ 
6KW9-A6PS]; see also Kery Murakami, Immigrant Deportations Up Sharply Under Trump, MANKATO 
FREE PRESS (Aug. 19, 2017), http://www.mankatofreepress.com/news/local_news/immigrant-
deportations-up-sharply-under-trump/article_a2b7b8d3-d00b-5839-9f1d-8de5d83b3696.html [https:// 
perma.cc/G757-6R9R] (reporting ICE’s statement that the agency is no longer exercising leniency with 
respect to undocumented residents who have not committed weighty crimes). 
 16 See infra Section III.A. 
 17 See infra Section III.B. 
 18 See infra Section III.C. 
 19 See, e.g., Rafael Bernal, Sessions Rips ‘Culture of Lawlessness’ in Chicago, HILL (Aug. 7, 2017, 
6:39 PM), http://thehill.com/latino/345668-sessions-rips-culture-of-lawlessness-in-chicago 
[https://perma.cc/KEV2-2ZH9] (reporting on Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s statement that “the 
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first executive orders, for instance, asserted that “sanctuary jurisdictions . . . 
willfully violate Federal law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal.”20 
Even those who are generally sympathetic to sanctuaries sometimes 
describe their efforts and objectives as rooted in the obstruction of 
governing law—most prominently as a form of civil disobedience directed 
at an unduly harsh immigration system, pursued in the name of a “higher” 
(i.e., religious or moral) law.21 The usual storyline is simple: immigration 
enforcers are trying to carry out legal commands, while sanctuary efforts 
are undertaken to impede the law.22 
In this Article, I argue that this frame is too facile. The better view is 
that sanctuary efforts function not as legal obstructions but as engines 
furthering critical legal norms in the face of the Executive Branch’s 
indiscriminate enforcement policies. To explain why, however, requires 
grappling with the deep complexities of immigration law. The significance 
of sanctuary policies in the current immigration enforcement crackdown 
cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the broader 
historical and statutory context of immigration law. For most of the 
twentieth century, immigration judges were empowered to set aside a 
deportable noncitizen’s removal when warranted by the equities. This 
power was seen as necessary to avoid grave injustice in individual cases.23 
Statutory provisions enacted in the 1990s, however, dramatically expanded 
the kinds of criminal offenses and immigration violations that would lead 
to deportation, while at the same time constricting the back-end 
discretionary authority of adjudicators to provide relief from these 
increasingly onerous sanctions.24 In this period, Congress also created a 
 
political leadership of Chicago has chosen deliberately and intentionally to adopt a policy that obstructs 
this country’s lawful immigration system”); see also Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal 
Anachronism, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 612 (2014) (making a similar argument and citing sources). 
 20 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 30, 2017); see also Paul Bedard, ICE Chief Lists Worst Sanctuary Cities: Chicago, 
NYC, San Francisco, Philadelphia, WASH. EXAMINER (July 24, 2017, 7:27 AM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ice-chief-lists-worst-sanctuary-cities-chicago-nyc-san-francisco-
philadelphia [https://perma.cc/P6XK-G7YQ] (describing sanctuary cities as “un-American” because 
they “harbor[] criminal illegal immigrants”). 
 21 See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 140–41 (2008) 
(describing the “morally-based arguments of the sanctuary movement” as in conflict with the “rule-of-
law principle that the federal government sought to employ”). 
 22 Cf. Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen 
Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 911 (1995) (“This rendition of Sanctuary as law-breaking protest 
evokes a familiar picture and, for many Americans, not a terribly troubling narrative of maintaining 
social order through the rule of law in the world’s premier democracy.”). 
 23 See infra Part I. 
 24 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 
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variety of mechanisms that allowed federal enforcers in the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to remove many categories of noncitizens from 
the purview of immigration court altogether, thus authorizing fast-track 
proceedings presided over solely by enforcement officials.25 The 
cumulative result of these changes was a removal code of unprecedented 
harshness and rigidity, with cruel consequences that soon began to make 
headlines.26 
And yet, removing equitable discretionary authority from adjudicators 
did not excise it from the system altogether.27 The exercise of equitable 
discretion by enforcers remained a necessary component to ensure the 
system continued to comport with basic justice.28 Indeed, for over sixteen 
years, across both Republican and Democratic administrations, federal 
enforcers were deeply engaged in the process of developing and refining 
equitable enforcement policies.29 Across that same time period, the 
Supreme Court issued a variety of rulings that not only acknowledged the 
necessity of enforcement-based system equity, but increased the 
opportunities for discretionary interventions by enforcers.30 
Political and judicial branches have engaged in this project of 
equitable enforcement—despite the apparent statutory rigidity of modern 
immigration law—because the immigration system is unique among civil 
enforcement fields with respect to the gravity of benefits and sanctions it 
administers. Indeed, deportation often threatens life-destroying 
consequences for noncitizens and their families. Such a system demands 
that the individual human beings who face such dire consequences be 
afforded some measure of equitable discretion—what I have described in 
 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 & 42 
U.S.C.); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. 
 25 See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 
193–98 (2017); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 
5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6–7, 22–25 (2014). 
 26 See, e.g., Joseph Ditzler, Detentions Spark Protest, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 31, 2001, at 1; Gayda 
Hollnagel, Immigration Sweeps Disrupt Small Towns, Separate Families, WIS. ST. J., Dec. 25, 1997, at 
1C, https://madison.newspaperarchive.com/madison-wisconsin-state-journal/1997-12-25/page-19 
[https://perma.cc/8CS3-NS4G]; Anthony Lewis, Congress Needs to Restore Humanity to U.S. 
Immigration Policy, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Dec. 22, 1997, at D07; Eric Lipton, Shoplifting Gets Woman 
Kicked out of Country, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 21, 1999, at A01; Nancy Lofholm, INS 
Doubles Staff for Colorado Crackdown, DENVER POST, Dec. 30, 1999, at A01; Marianne Means, 
Deportations Putting Public at Some Risk, TIMES UNION (Albany), Dec. 22, 1997, at A7. 
 27 See infra Section I.B. 
 28 See infra Section I.C. 
 29 See infra Part II. 
 30 See infra Section I.D. 
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previous articles as “immigration equity”31—in keeping with basic 
principles of fairness, equality, and proportionality. If not at the back end, 
these concerns must be realized in early stages of immigration-related 
decision-making.32 Thus, the structure of deportation law mirrors criminal 
law, where prosecutorial discretion has long been recognized as necessary 
to ensure individual justice in the face of overbroad criminal codes.33 
When federal agencies fail to adequately undertake this equitable 
responsibility—instead engaging in mass, indiscriminate enforcement—
justice is not reliably meted out, jeopardizing the legitimacy of the 
deportation system. Legitimacy encompasses both legal accuracy (ensuring 
that deportations are not contrary to federal law) and normative accuracy 
(ensuring that equitable factors are weighed before deportation is rigidly 
applied in individual cases).34 While there obviously cannot be a one-size-
fits-all rule for the proper equitable result in all deportation cases, previous 
administrators worked to develop detailed standards to guide agency 
officials.35 The Trump Administration’s wholesale disregard of the 
responsibility to equitably enforce the law has led and will continue to lead 
to unjust and arbitrary consequences in many cases. As a result, the locus 
of discretion shifts further upstream, to the local police, state prosecutors, 
and other nonfederal institutions in local communities, including churches 
and campuses. Some of these actors have chosen courses of action that 
promote equitable norms in the operation of immigration enforcement. 
Sanctuaries, I argue, have helped the system incorporate some fairness into 
real-life immigration decision-making, achieving results that are 
normatively more accurate. 
Depending on the type of sanctuary measure at issue, these 
legitimizing forces may take hold at different stages of the enforcement 
process. Municipalities and campuses with limited-cooperation policies, for 
instance, impose an “equitable screen” at the front end of the system. The 
 
 31 See Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 664–65 (2015) 
[hereinafter Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity]; Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: 
Deportation and Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029 (2017) [hereinafter 
Cade, Judging Immigration Equity]. 
 32 See Jason A. Cade, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 36 (2015) (arguing that 
Department of Homeland Security officials should defer to signals by criminal court judges that 
deportation would not be appropriate in particular cases). 
 33 See infra Section I.B. 
 34 See infra Part IV; cf. Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the 
Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1019–21 (2014) (explaining the 
difference between legal accuracy and moral accuracy). 
 35 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 708 (“The point is that some 
balancing should take place in individual cases, even for ‘criminal noncitizens,’ to safeguard against 
injustice and arbitrary action in the removal system.”); infra Part II. 
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federal immigration system has long relied on criminal justice actors to 
identify and process “undesirable” noncitizens.36 By declining to turn 
noncitizens over to federal authorities, sanctuary communities operate 
something like normative grand juries, refusing to indict except where 
aggravating factors are present.37 These screening measures bear other 
legitimacy-enhancing consequences, too. Of particular importance, 
cooperation-limiting measures bolster the ability of noncitizens and citizens 
alike to engage in certain protected aspects of family and civic life without 
illegitimate intrusion by federal or state immigration enforcers.38 
Cities and churches that provide support and legal representation to 
persons in detention or removal proceedings help hold the government to 
its burden of proof and improve the likelihood that eligibility for lawful 
status or defenses to removal will be fairly considered.39 Sanctuaries can 
also play the role of a last-resort circuit-breaker.40 The physical refuge 
provided to Jeanette Vizguerra in Denver illustrates this dynamic. The 
provision of true sanctuary—in the literal, historically familiar sense—
shielded her from immediate removal after formal processes had run out, 
allowing negotiation on her behalf that ultimately led ICE to permit her to 
remain in the country while her application for U status proceeds. 
The various forms of sanctuary that I consider in this Article spring 
from a range of motivations, implicate different legal rules, and vary in 
effectiveness.41 Each of them, however, has the potential to inject 
legitimizing dynamics into the current immigration enforcement landscape. 
As a result of sanctuary activities, some individual noncitizens who should 
not be deported will be spared. The policies will enable even more 
individuals to engage in constitutionally protected civic life, to the wider 
benefit of their families and communities. Together, these outcomes will 
help foster at least localized tonics against growing immigrant cynicism 
regarding the legitimacy of the immigration enforcement system, and by 
extension, its criminal system adjuncts.42 Meanwhile, the high visibility of 
sanctuary efforts, along with the credibility of the particular institutions 
involved, will help shape opinion and influence public discourse nationally, 
 
 36 See infra Section IV.A. 
 37 See infra Section IV.A. 
 38 See infra Section IV.D. 
 39 See infra Section IV.B. 
 40 See infra Sections IV.C. 
 41 See infra Parts III, V. 
 42 See Emily Ryo, Fostering Legal Cynicism Through Immigration Detention, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
999, 1003 (2017) (exploring how the punitive, arbitrary, and inscrutable nature of the immigration 
detention system as experienced by noncitizens can lead to deep and widespread distrust of the legal 
system). 
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perhaps generating broader support for more humane immigration policies 
in the future.43 
By focusing on the functions that different sanctuary forms share in 
the context of mass immigration enforcement, I provide a unifying account 
of public and private defensive sanctuary efforts, which thus far have been 
considered for the most part in isolation.44 More importantly, I make the 
case that sanctuary efforts comport with deep-rooted principles of justice, 
including equity-based principles vindicated repeatedly in modern Supreme 
Court rulings concerning immigration enforcement. 
This Article develops these points in five Parts. Part I outlines the 
significant transition that has occurred in immigration law and enforcement 
in recent decades, moving away from formal equitable adjudication toward 
the empowerment of nonadjudicators in determining whether deportation 
law is administered fairly and proportionally. I explain why faithful 
execution of the immigration scheme requires attention to this equitable 
responsibility, and I show that the Supreme Court has endorsed the 
necessity of this new enforcement-based system of equity, issuing rulings 
designed to facilitate consideration of proportionality and fairness by both 
federal and local actors. 
Part II reviews how recent administrations have dealt with the need to 
undertake this equitable task. As I explain, immigration agencies began to 
implement prosecutorial discretion policies during the George W. Bush 
Administration in response to the emerging deleterious consequences of 
Congress’s new statutory regime. Immigration agencies continued to refine 
these discretionary approaches for a decade and a half, and that process 
gained significant momentum during President Obama’s first term. The 
Trump Administration, in contrast, has sought to displace this reified 
system of equitable enforcement discretion with a radically new system, 
one characterized by a mass, indiscriminate approach to immigration 
enforcement. 
Part III describes the three primary subfederal entities engaged in 
sanctuary activity: cities, churches, and campuses. For each form, I briefly 
touch on the most salient legal justifications for the various activities, but 
only to make the point that each is likely on sufficiently solid legal footing 
to weather challenges from the federal officials who oppose them. I turn to 
my larger argument in Part IV, explaining that the emergence of all these 
forms of sanctuary activity should be viewed as the latest development in 
 
 43 See infra Section IV.E. 
 44 For an exception, see Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, 
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3038943 
[https://perma.cc/RS9Y-NW2F]. 
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the upstream relocation of immigration law equity. Stepping into the 
equitable void left by the Executive Branch, sanctuaries are generating new 
ways of injecting a measure of salutary equitable discretion into real-world 
deportation processes. Because sanctuaries, at bottom, promote fairness and 
justice in immigration-related decision-making, they have a strong claim to 
legitimacy in light of immigration law’s overarching and judicially 
recognized context. In Part V, I address some of the limitations and 
drawbacks of relying on sanctuary policies for equity in immigration 
enforcement. To be sure, the positive effects that sanctuaries offer in 
achieving immigration equity are limited in efficacy and reach. Even so, in 
both the short-term and long-term, sanctuaries can make a positive 
difference. This Article concludes by suggesting possibilities for the future 
of the sanctuary movement and the role courts might play in protecting 
immigration equity’s last stand. 
I. OVERBROAD REMOVAL GROUNDS REQUIRE EQUITABLE 
ENFORCEMENT DECISION-MAKING 
A. The Shift to Statutory Severity 
In the late twentieth century, Congress set into motion a radical 
restructuring of immigration enforcement and the deportation scheme.45 
Through extensive changes to the immigration code,46 Congress vastly 
increased the number of lawfully present noncitizens subject to deportation 
on the basis of even minor criminal history,47 made all unauthorized 
presence a deportable offense, and barred most paths to lawful status for 
noncitizens who entered without inspection unless they first depart the 
country, which in turn typically triggers a ten-year prohibition on lawful 
return.48 At the same time, Congress tightly constrained the authority of 
 
 45 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 671–83; Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 463 (2009). 
 46 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 & 42 
U.S.C.). 
 47 See, e.g., Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2015) (concerning the appeal of 
a forty-two-year-old lawful permanent resident who had lived in the country for forty years and was 
deported as an “aggravated felon[]” after shoplifting a $2 can of beer). See generally 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2) (2012) (listing many categories of crimes that make lawfully present noncitizens 
deportable); Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758–63 (2013) (discussing the statutory provisions that make lawfully 
present noncitizens deportable on the basis of even minor crimes). 
 48 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (noncitizens who enter without inspection are inadmissible and 
therefore cannot adjust lawful status); id. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (noncitizens present without authorization are 
deportable); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (ten-year reentry bar for noncitizens previously present in the United 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
444 
administrative immigration judges and criminal sentencing judges to 
exercise the equitable discretionary powers they had employed for most of 
immigration law’s history to avoid unjust or disproportionate removals.49  
Today, few statutory provisions allow undocumented noncitizens to 
avoid deportation on humanitarian or equitable grounds. Such relief is 
available only to those who (1) have very long residence in the United 
States, no disqualifying criminal record, and immediate U.S. citizen family 
members who would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship 
by the noncitizen’s removal;50 or (2) are victims of trafficking, abuse, or 
other specified serious crimes in the United States and can meet other 
criteria.51 Moreover, Congress created numerous mechanisms permitting 
the fast-track removal of large categories of noncitizens without any formal 
immigration proceedings at all.52 Finally, amendments to the immigration 
code in the 1990s greatly expanded the use of immigration detention, 
mandating or permitting immigration authorities to employ detention in a 
wide variety of circumstances, including many situations that have little or 
 
States without authorization for one year or more; three-year reentry bar if the period of unlawful 
presence was between 181 and 364 days). 
 49 See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (discussing the elimination of 212(c) and 
the Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation, as well as other constrictions of adjudicative relief 
from removal); Cade, supra note 32, at 40–41 (discussing the statutory measures for equitable 
discretion in immigration enforcement before and after Congress’s statutory changes in the 1990s). 
 50 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (addressing cancellation of removal for both lawful permanent 
residents (LPRs) and noncitizens without lawful status). For purposes of eligibility for cancellation of 
removal, the required periods of continuous presence are deemed to end upon commission of criminal 
offenses or the inception of removal proceedings. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, 
at 677–78 (explaining the limitations of cancellation of removal provisions); see also Margaret H. 
Taylor, What Happened to Non-LPR Cancellation? Rationalizing Immigration Enforcement by 
Restoring Durable Relief from Removal, 30 J.L. & POL. 527, 540–42 (2015) (discussing how the 
statutory annual cap of 4000 grants of cancellation for non-LPRs created a backlog, significantly 
forestalling the effectiveness of such relief). 
 51 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (trafficking victims); id. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (victims of designated 
serious crimes who assist law enforcement); id. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (juveniles dependent on family court 
due to parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment). Asylum is another statutory form of humanitarian 
relief but is exceedingly difficult to obtain, as it requires the noncitizen to apply within one year of entry 
to the United States and to prove a likelihood of torture or persecution by the government of his country 
of origin on account of race or another protected ground, among other restrictions and requirements. See 
id. § 1158. 
 52 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN 
DIASPORA 52–67 (2012) (identifying a “bewildering array of . . . fast-track mechanisms” for removal); 
Koh, supra note 25, at 193–221 (describing five types of removal orders that occur in “immigration 
court’s shadows”); Wadhia, supra note 25, at 22–25 (describing expedited removal, reinstatement of 
removal, and administrative removal as instances of “speed deportation”). 
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no bearing on the underlying assessment of risk that would typically justify 
the deprivation of liberty.53 
Cumulatively, these changes wrought a deportation system that now 
subjects many millions of long-term noncitizens to the possibility of 
detention and removal, including lawful permanent residents who have 
only minor criminal histories, with limited opportunities for judges to 
consider whether these severe sanctions are justified in individual cases. 
Frequently, the collateral consequences of a deportation extend far beyond 
the individual, including the separation of a caregiver from a U.S. citizen 
spouse or children and a variety of direct and indirect economic losses.54 In 
the Supreme Court’s words, “deportation may result in the loss of all that 
makes life worth living.”55 
The legislative constriction of immigration and sentencing judges’ 
authority to set aside removal, however, does not necessarily remove all 
consideration of fairness and proportionality from the system. Instead, 
when adjudicative discretion contracts, such considerations shift to other 
 
 53 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C § 1225(a), (b)(2)(A) (requiring 
detention of noncitizens seeking admission who are “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be 
admitted”); id. § 1226(c) (providing that immigration officials “shall take into custody any alien who [is 
inadmissible or deportable on most criminal grounds] . . . when the alien is released”); id. § 1231(a)(2), 
(a)(6) (requiring detention for up to ninety days following a removal order and authorizing continued 
detention beyond that period on a discretionary basis). See generally Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and 
Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 365 (2014) (discussing 
the implementation of mandatory and discretionary immigration detention); Cade, Judging Immigration 
Equity, supra note 31, at 1029, 1082–92 (same); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing 
Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1449 (2015) (same). 
 54 See RANDY CAPPS ET AL., URBAN INST. & MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMPLICATIONS OF 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES FOR THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN IN IMMIGRANT 
FAMILIES (2015) (explaining the psychological trauma, economic hardship, and instability experienced 
by the children of immigrant parents due to workplace raids and other enforcement activities); JOANNA 
DREBY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW TODAY’S IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICIES IMPACT 
CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES: A VIEW FROM THE GROUND 2 (2012) (addressing the 
consequences of deportation for those left behind, such as single mothers who struggle to provide for 
their families and the detrimental effect on children’s health and mentality); see also Sibylla Brodzinsky 
& Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central American Migrants to Their Deaths, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 12, 2015, 8:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-
deportations-central-america [https://perma.cc/9AM6-SYKD] (analyzing data regarding deportees 
killed upon return to the violent countries they fled); Eline de Bruijn, Deportation Was a ‘Death 
Sentence’ for Austin Father Sent Back to Mexico, Lawyer Says, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 20, 
2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2017/09/20/man-fled-mexico-fear-gangs-killed-
deported-austin-wife-says [https://perma.cc/G4A9-59G8]; Sarah Elizabeth Richards, How Fear of 
Deportation Puts Stress on Families, ATLANTIC (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/ 
archive/2017/03/deportation-stress/520008 [https://perma.cc/X8WP-97HW] (examining the effects of 
deportation-related anxiety on families, especially children who can suffer stress severe enough to 
inhibit development, leading to mental, emotional, and cognitive disabilities). 
 55 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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parts of the system.56 Perhaps paradoxically, the Executive’s duty to 
faithfully execute the law in the immigration context requires attention and 
responsiveness to individual equitable circumstances rather than rote 
application of rigid code law. In the following Sections, I elaborate on this 
claim. 
B. Deportation Laws Are Not Designed for Rigid Enforcement 
Formal code law is only one ingredient in the complex admixture that 
creates a legal regime. As Dean Roscoe Pound observed over a century 
ago, there is always a gap between “law in books” and “law in action.”57 
Enforcement priorities, resource constraints, constitutional limitations, 
political will, and other factors have as much to say about how a particular 
field is regulated as black letter statutes. Lawmakers, knowing this reality, 
enact many laws without the anticipation of full enforcement, allowing 
(and often counting on) calibration and refinement through on-the-ground 
implementation.58 This tempering process is particularly evident, and 
necessary, in fields that administer severe penalties, where harsh legislation 
is politically advantageous but can wreck great injustice in particular 
cases.59 Legislators have political incentives to increase the severity of 
 
 56 Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1038 (“As with squeezing a balloon, the 
contraction of judicial authority to wield equitable discretion has expanded the role of police and 
prosecutorial discretion in evaluating and extending relief to noncitizens based on their individual 
circumstances.”). 
 57 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 34 (1910) (“[T]he law upon 
the statute books will be far from representing what takes place actually . . . .”); see also William J. 
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 521 (2001) (“Broad 
[criminal] codes cannot be enforced as written; thus, the definition of the law-on-the-street necessarily 
differs, and may differ a lot, from the law-on-the-books.”). 
 58 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 87 (2d prtg. 
1970) (arguing that “legislation has long been written in reliance on the expectation that law 
enforcement officers will correct its excesses through administration”); Robert E. Scott & William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1963 (1992) (arguing that legislators intend 
that prosecutors will “exercise their discretion not to pursue habitual criminal sentencing for offenders 
who [fall] within the statute but seem[] not to deserve such harsh treatment”); cf. Ehud Guttel & Doron 
Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the Innocent, 110 MICH. L. REV. 597, 601–07 (2012) 
(citing evidence that legislators sometimes act based on awareness or assumptions about correlations 
between statutory severity, prosecutorial choices, and likelihood of conviction). 
 59 Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1664–65 (2010) (“Legislators pass broad and deep criminal codes not only 
to appear tough on crime, but also for efficiency’s sake: They seek to leave determinations of optimal 
enforcement to the executive. They purposefully avoid the particulars, anticipating case-specific, back-
end equitable intervention.” (footnote omitted)); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due 
Process When Everything Is a Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102, 102–03 (2013) (describing 
examples of public criticism and legislative responses when prosecutors fail to exercise the tremendous 
discretion delegated to them by broad penal legislation in equitably appropriate ways); Stuntz, supra 
note 57, at 569–79 (“[T]here are two keys to legislative incentives in this area—prosecutors’ ability to 
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criminal laws, for example, relying on police and prosecutors to exercise 
discretion in determining whom to arrest and prosecute.60 Enacting broad, 
inflexible penal statutes and mandatory sentencing guidelines thus transfers 
equitable power to police and prosecutors, who act as the criminal system’s 
normative gatekeepers.61 The acceptability and expectation of executive 
underenforcement of penal law for reasons of justice has roots reaching 
back to the early days of the Republic.62 
In the immigration context, Congress has delegated vast enforcement 
authority through both formal and indirect means.63 As an initial matter, 
specific statutory provisions afford wide latitude to DHS to determine 
enforcement priorities.64 But even without those vague delegations, 
Congress effectively transferred a great deal of gatekeeping power to the 
deportation system’s enforcers when it expanded the grounds for removal 
while narrowing adjudicative discretionary authority.65 About 11 million 
persons are present in the United States without authorization, and many 
hundreds of thousands more are lawfully present but potentially deportable 
for civil or criminal offenses.66 The development of this large unauthorized 
 
decline to charge, and prosecutors’ incentive to charge only those whom the public wishes to see 
charged.”). 
 60 See DAVIS, supra note 58, at 87; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 58, at 1963; William J. Stuntz, 
Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (2008) [hereinafter Stuntz, Unequal Justice] 
(“[C]riminal justice policies are mostly political symbols or legal abstractions, not questions the 
answers to which define neighborhood life.”). 
 61 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3–4 (2011) (“Law 
enforcers . . . define the laws they enforce.”); see also ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE 
POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 154–57 (2007); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s 
Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 533 (1970); Kate Stith, The Arc of the 
Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1422 (2008). 
 62 Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 716–48 
(2014). Professor Price provides evidence that between 1801 and 1828, federal district attorneys 
terminated roughly a third of federal prosecutions as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, with 
judicial acquiescence, and discusses correspondence between high-ranking federal government officials 
directing nonprosecution in cases where mitigating factors demanded equity. Id.; see also Stith, supra 
note 61, at 1422 (arguing that Congress “has created a system of criminal laws that requires—and has 
always required—the exercise of discretion”). 
 63 See Cade, supra note 32, at 53–54 (discussing congressional delegation of authority to the 
Executive to determine immigration enforcement priorities). 
 64 See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012) (charging the Secretary of Homeland Security with “[e]stablishing 
national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012) (conferring 
broad power to the Secretary of Homeland Security over “the administration and enforcement of this 
chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens”). 
 65 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 679–81; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 
45, at 464, 518–19. 
 66 Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable for Half a Decade, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/unauthorized-
immigrant-population-stable-for-half-a-decade [https://perma.cc/HZ6F-29AY]. 
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population can be explained, in part, by longstanding political acquiescence 
under both Republican and Democratic administrations, including a century 
of economic reliance on migrants from Mexico for cheap labor.67 Even as 
laws and attitudes about undocumented workers and immigration 
enforcement have become more stringent, Congress’s growing budgetary 
appropriations in recent years to the immigration agencies have enabled the 
removal of only a small fraction of the total number of noncitizens who 
may be deportable on the basis of unlawful presence, criminal history, or 
other infractions.68 The confluence of these factors works to delegate 
tremendous de facto discretionary enforcement power. Thus, although the 
Obama Administration actualized more than 2.5 million removals—far 
more than any other administration in history—many of these reflected the 
prioritization of border enforcement actions and the use of summary 
procedures for recent entrants or persons previously removed, representing 
but a drop in the bucket relative to the size of the pool of possible 
enforcement targets living within the interior United States.69 
Because Congress enacted broad and rigid statutory provisions against 
the backdrop of this long history of underenforcement, without 
commensurate increases in funding, there are undeniable practical limits on 
any administration’s capability to enforce the law on the books. Legislators 
cannot realistically have expected the new rules to be fully enforced.70 In 
other words, Congress tacitly or implicitly relies on the Executive Branch 
to set priorities and exercise equitable discretion when determining which 
percentage of the total removable population to target. 
 
 67 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 19–55 (2014). As Professor Motomura 
has explained, there has always been a large population of noncitizens living and working without 
authorization in the U.S. Id. at 24–25, 172–74. 
 68 Furthermore, Congress’s immigration enforcement appropriation acts have typically provided 
that DHS prioritize among noncitizens deportable on the basis of criminal history. See, e.g., 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5, 251; Consolidated Security, 
Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 
3659. 
 69 Koh, supra note 25, at 184 (citing statistics that over 83% of removals in recent years were 
through expedited procedures that bypass immigration court); Serena Marshall, Obama Has Deported 
More People Than Any Other President, ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016, 2:05 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obamas-deportation-policy-numbers/story?id=41715661 
[https://perma.cc/53M4-26PJ]. 
 70 See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text; see also Michael D. Gilbert, Insincere Rules, 
101 VA. L. REV. 2185 (2015) (arguing that legal rules can be intentionally insincere); Zachary S. Price, 
Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571, 1605 (2016) (“[O]nce 
widespread nonenforcement becomes practically inevitable, Congress may enact laws with the 
expectation that they will not be fully enforced; and by the same token, it may choose not to devote 
legislative effort to narrowing or repealing existing laws that would be deeply unpopular if fully 
enforced, precisely because those laws’ nonenforcement reduces the urgency to update them.”). 
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Deportation laws thus present a variation of what Professor Michael 
Gilbert labels “insincere rules,” which are statutes or regulations designed 
to achieve a result that is less than co-extensive with the literal letter of the 
law.71 Insincere rules are everywhere, from speed limits to environmental 
standards to criminal laws to tax regulation.72 The basic idea is that by 
overshooting with rules on the books, lawmakers hope to get something 
close to what they actually want with rules in action. Professor Gilbert 
argues that as the cost of enforcement within a particular field increases, 
the gap between desired behavior and legislated restrictions is also likely to 
widen.73 Greater sanctions will be necessary to achieve general compliance 
whenever enforcement is very costly, in terms of either resources or 
political will.74 Given the historically sporadic enforcement of deportation 
rules and the practical impossibility of attempting to remove more than 11 
million presumptively deportable immigrants, the severity of immigration 
penalties may be roughly calibrated to achieve a measure of general 
deterrence desired by Congress. 
Indeed, when media accounts began highlighting stories about the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) indiscriminate 
enforcement against long-time lawful permanent residents of the harsher 
statutory provisions enacted in 1996, many of the legislators who had voted 
for the revisions wrote a letter to the Attorney General urging more 
systematic prosecutorial discretion in order to avoid “unfair” deportations 
and “unjustifiable hardship.”75 The twenty-eight bipartisan cosigners of the 
letter could not understand “why the INS pursued removal in such cases 
when so many other more serious cases existed.”76 This letter is not law, 
but it helps substantiate this account of the insincerity of modern 
deportation rules. 
The bottom line is that, with immigration law, as in many other areas 
of regulatory enforcement, there is an understood—and intended—gap 
between “law in books” and “law in action.”77 For the reasons I have stated, 
 
 71 Gilbert, supra note 70, at 2205. 
 72 Id. at 2186. 
 73 Id. at 2205. 
 74 Id. at 2209–10, 2213 (“Precisely because enforcement capacity is limited, rule-makers have an 
incentive to adopt demanding, insincere rules.”). 
 75 Letter from Twenty-Eight Members of the U.S. House of Representatives to Janet Reno, 
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and to Doris M. Meissner, Comm’r, INS (Nov. 4, 1999), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/991104congress-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
X6M7-RH54] [hereinafter Letter to Reno]. The INS was the predecessor agency to DHS, which was 
created in 2003. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Pound, supra note 57, at 21; Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 49 (2017). 
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one can confidently infer that Congress counted on immigration enforcers 
to shape and temper the rigidity of the removal provisions. 
C. Proportionality and Fairness Require Equitable Enforcement 
Even if one believes that Congress desired rigid and absolute 
enforcement of its harsh statutory rules, this view would not justify an 
indiscriminate approach to deportation. The removal system imposes dire, 
life-altering penalties on the basis of a broad range of civil and criminal 
infractions, while providing few formal avenues to set aside these 
consequences in the balance of equities. I have argued elsewhere at length 
that proportionality and basic fairness require that enforcement decisions 
account for equitable considerations and afford noncitizens facing removal 
adequate due process.78 Here I will briefly summarize the main points. 
Immigration officials have a responsibility to be “minister[s] of 
justice,” and seek normatively correct outcomes.79 Equitable discretion is 
necessary to implement the deportation scheme fairly, with attention to 
disproportionate consequences in individual circumstances. “[I]mmigration 
enforcement obligations do not consist only of initiating and conducting 
prompt proceedings that lead to removals at any cost. Rather, as has been 
said, the government wins when justice is done.”80 DHS agents and 
attorneys are not exempted from this obligation; instead, they are “duty-
bound to ‘cut square corners’ and seek justice rather than victory.”81 Even 
where the foreign national lacks any current path to lawful status, basic 
justice sometimes demands the use of prosecutorial discretion in order to 
avoid overly severe sanctions.82 
Any legal scheme that administers consequences as significant as 
deportation should reflect the principle of proportionality. Proportionality 
refers to the fit between the gravity of the underlying offenses, tempered by 
 
 78 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31; Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra 
note 31; Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police: ICE Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth 
Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180 (2013) [hereinafter Cade, Policing the Immigration 
Police]; Cade, supra note 32. 
 79 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); Josh 
Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2017) (making a similar argument about other law 
enforcers); Margaret H. Lemos, Accountability and Independence in Public Enforcement 25 (Duke Law 
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2016-23, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2748720 [https://perma.cc/86VY-KN8S] (arguing that because enforcement actions 
typically lack judicial oversight, “enforcers are not just advocates for one side; they have substantial 
responsibility for deciding what outcome is fair and just, all things considered”). 
 80 Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 727 (B.I.A. 1997). 
 81 Kang v. Attorney Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 82 DAVIS, supra note 58, at 25 (“Discretion is a tool, indispensable for individualization of 
justice.”). 
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any mitigating factors, and the severity of the sanction.83 To be sure, there 
is no universal agreement about the point at which a given penalty becomes 
disproportionate.84 Nevertheless, most lawyers, scholars, and jurists accept 
that enforcers or enforcement systems should be sensitive to egregiousness, 
mitigating factors, and hardship.85 Because a commitment to 
proportionality recognizes that there is no “invariant, objective deserved 
punishment for each offensive act,” as Professor Stephen Morse has 
written, no statute can possibly be just in all its applications.86 Professor 
Lawrence Solum similarly observed that “the infinite variety and 
complexity of particular fact situations outruns our capacity to formulate 
general rules.”87 In turn, this inability to create rules precise and flexible 
enough to avoid normative error means that “it is justice itself, not a 
departure from justice, to use equity’s flexible standard.”88 We need, and 
have always needed, equitable correction of rigid rules. At some point, the 
gap between the consequences of deportation for an affected individual and 
the nature of the underlying circumstances becomes too wide, raising 
proportionality problems. 
Government agents charged with meting out life-altering sanctions on 
a large scale must be “responsive to the unique circumstances of individual 
 
 83 See Austin Lovegrove, Proportionality Theory, Personal Mitigation, and the People’s Sense of 
Justice, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 321, 330 (2010) (“[T]he severity of the punishment should be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the offence in question; but it also should be appropriate, having 
regard to the offender’s personal mitigation.”); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the 
Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 416 (2012) (“Proportionality is the notion that 
the severity of a sanction should not be excessive in relation to the gravity of an offense.”). 
 84 Bowers, supra note 79, at 142 (“There is no obvious answer to the question of when the state has 
criminalized too much, too hard.”). 
 85 See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 
62 EMORY L.J. 1243, 1663–71 (2013); Jason A. Cade, Judicial Review of Disproportionate (or 
Retaliatory) Deportation, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427, 1449–72 (2018) (outlining possibilities for 
increased judicial scrutiny of deportation on various constitutional grounds); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and 
Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1445 (1995); Wishnie, supra note 83, at 418–24 (collecting and 
discussing authorities). 
 86 Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1493 (1984) 
(reviewing NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982)); see also DAVID GARLAND, 
PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 1 (1990) (arguing that legislated 
sanctions fall short of societal expectations because “we have tried to convert a deeply social issue into 
a technical task for specialist institutions”). 
 87 Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 
34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 206 (2003); see also ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 133 (David 
Ross trans., J. L Ackrill & J. O. Urmson rev. ed., 1998) (explaining that “about some things it is not 
possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct” and that therefore when it is necessary 
for the law “to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, 
though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error”). 
 88 Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 93–96 (1993). 
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transgressions.”89 Persons—citizens and noncitizens alike—who commit 
civil and criminal violations fall along “a vast spectrum of human character 
and behavior,” and treating them all the same can work great injustice for 
those who had “made single mistakes or had shown genuine rehabilitation 
and remorse.”90 Moreover, in any given removal enforcement situation, the 
noncitizen may have established deep bonds of family, faith, employment, 
and friendship. In such cases, deportation results in extreme consequences, 
“both for that individual and for the family members, persons, and 
institutions at the other end of those connections.”91 Thus, when enforcers 
blindly apply overbroad and formally inflexible rules, they do “not merely 
fail to do justice, they may do positive injustice.”92 
Agents charged with faithfully carrying out the law—including federal 
enforcers—must consult not only statutory text but also context.93 
Adherence to context includes consideration of the entire legislative plan, 
constitutional constraints, and rule-of-law commitments such as notice, 
consistency, and procedural justice.94 In Professor Margaret Lemos’s 
words, “‘good’ enforcement is not the same thing as maximum 
enforcement.”95 These considerations have led Professor Mila Sohoni to 
persuasively argue that the President’s constitutional obligation to 
 
 89 MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC 
SERVICES 15 (1980) (“[S]ociety seeks not only impartiality from its public agencies but also 
compassion for special circumstances and flexibility in dealing with them.”); see also KANSTROOM, 
supra note 52, at 219 (arguing that because European law requires balancing of private and public 
interests in deportation cases, the system “preserves an important measure of respect for human rights 
norms and a powerful safeguard against arbitrary government actions”). 
 90 David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real 
Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 64. 
 91 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 709; see also Banks, supra note 85, at 
1293–96 (discussing social science literature documenting the collateral consequences of deportation 
for family members left behind). 
 92 Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special 
Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 928 (1960); see also DAVIS, supra note 58, at 25 (“Rules alone, 
untempered by discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modern government and of modern 
justice.”). 
 93 Sohoni, supra note 77, at 83. 
 94 Id. (“Whether she be judge or mayor, a faithful interpretive agent properly consults not only text, 
but also context, ‘the legislative plan,’ the public interest, constitutional rules, and commitments to rule-
of-law values such as fair notice and procedural justice.” (footnote omitted)). But cf. David S. 
Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168, 205 (2018) (arguing that the 
relevant context for rule-of-law evaluations depends on which frames and facts are selected). 
 95 Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 705 (2011); see 
also Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 
12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 62 (2001) (“Optimal enforcement is nearly always less than 
complete enforcement.”). 
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faithfully execute the law96 is violated by a “crackdown” approach to 
enforcement.97 But one need not find a constitutional hook, however, to 
agree that all branches of the government engaged in the enforcement of 
any area of the law must strive to follow, and promote, ideals of fairness 
and justice. Rigidly enforcing any law to the fullest extent possible is likely 
to violate this obligation—perhaps particularly so with respect to the 
drastic sanction of deportation. 
D. The Supreme Court’s Embrace of Upstream Equity 
The previous Sections explained that, in the immigration context, 
Congress’s expansion of deportability grounds and contraction of back-end 
adjudicative equity provisions shifted power and responsibility to federal 
enforcers and subfederal actors to evaluate and implement proportionality 
concerns at the front-end stages of the process.98 In recent years, the 
Supreme Court has come to grips with the new reality of enforcement-
based equity in the deportation system. In fact, concerns about the system’s 
potential for disproportionality appear to have influenced much of the 
Court’s recent jurisprudence in this area.99 In Arizona v. United States, for 
example, the Court directly acknowledged that equity in the deportation 
scheme today depends almost entirely on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority explained that a 
“principle feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised 
by immigration officials.”100 It is worthwhile to appreciate the clarity of the 
Court’s understanding—and endorsement—of the connection between 
federal agencies’ exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the 
implementation of equity in the deportation system: 
Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to 
pursue removal at all. . . . Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law 
embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support 
their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or 
aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may 
turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the 
 
 96 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5 (the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”). 
 97 Sohoni, supra note 77, at 48–49. 
 98 Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 45, at 518–19 (“Prosecutorial discretion has . . . overtaken the 
exercise of discretion by immigration judges when it comes to questions of relief.”). 
 99 Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1041–82 (demonstrating that the Court’s 
immigration enforcement jurisprudence since 2001, across a range of substantive and procedural 
challenges, increases or preserves structural opportunities for equitable balancing at multiple levels in 
the deportation process). 
 100 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012). 
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United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military 
service. . . . Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed 
inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to 
meet the criteria for admission.101 
The Court in Arizona thus acknowledged that not all noncitizens made 
deportable by Congress are similarly situated, and that, as a result, 
executive enforcement officials should weigh “immediate human concerns” 
in determining the appropriateness of removal in particular cases, even 
where code law would seem to mandate removal.102 The Court found most 
of Arizona’s state-level immigration enforcement laws preempted, despite 
their mirroring of federal law provisions.103 I have previously argued that 
the Court’s concerns about proportionality in the removal system help 
explain its departure from typical preemption analysis in Arizona.104 In so 
ruling, the Court thereby protected federal discretionary authority to 
forebear removal—whether through individual discretionary decisions or as 
a result of macro enforcement policies—from unwanted state interference. 
Building on this upstream-equity doctrine, the Court has also issued a 
series of decisions that enable subfederal actors to take actions likely to 
minimize the chance of negative immigration outcomes.105 In Padilla v. 
Kentucky, for example, the Supreme Court endorsed the idea that front-line 
actors in the criminal justice system should take into account the harshness 
and inflexibility of immigration law and make adjustments when charging, 
plea bargaining, and sentencing.106 The Court’s watershed holding in that 
case—that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense counsel to 
render effective advice about the potential immigration consequences of a 
conviction—was firmly rooted in the new realities of federal immigration 
law, including the evisceration of opportunities for leniency in the face of 
 
 101 Id.  
 102 See generally Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1042–49 (explaining that the 
Court’s conception of noncitizen membership in the U.S. community is broader than current code law). 
 103 See Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. 
CT. REV. 31, 34–41 (explaining that state laws mirrored on federal laws are typically constitutional). 
 104 See Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1046 (arguing that the Arizona Court’s 
“newfound acknowledgment of the role of enforcement-driven proportionality in the deportation system 
helps explain its preemption rulings”); cf. Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten Equality Norm in 
Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2013) (“Courts should revitalize the equality norm in deciding whether a 
particular state immigration provision impedes federal interests or hinders federal goals.”). 
 105 See Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1049–93 (analyzing approximately 
fifteen years of the Supreme Court’s recent deportation jurisprudence to argue that “[a]cross a diverse 
set of legal issues, the cases evince a deep concern with the sweep of the statute, especially with respect 
to minor offenses leading to removal, detention, or to the inability to access discretionary relief”). 
 106 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010). 
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criminal convictions.107 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion noted that the 
grounds of criminal removal were narrow for much of the 20th century, and 
he zeroed in on the fact that “immigration reforms over time have 
expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of 
judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation.”108 Justice 
Stevens emphasized the recent loss of mitigating mechanisms at both 
federal and state levels, which he described as “critically important . . . to 
minimize the risk of unjust deportation.”109 As a result, “the drastic measure 
of deportation . . . is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of 
noncitizens convicted of crimes.”110 It would be constitutionally unfair, the 
Court reasoned, to allow persons to plead guilty without being aware that 
the penalty of deportation or other serious immigration consequences 
would follow.111 
Most important for present purposes was the Court’s explicit 
recognition that equitable discretion in the removal system has shifted to 
earlier enforcement stages and encouragement of defense attorneys and 
prosecutors to take immigration consequences into account by “plea 
bargaining creatively” to avoid disproportionate results.112 Padilla thus 
established and endorsed a structure for state and local actors to negotiate 
plea deals that help noncitizen defendants avoid unjust removals, or that at 
least preserve narrow possibilities for consideration of equitable 
discretionary relief in later deportation proceedings.113 
 
 107 Relying on erroneous advice from his attorney, Jose Padilla (a long-time lawful permanent 
resident) pled guilty to a criminal charge that all but guaranteed his deportation. Id. at 359; id. at 387–88 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 108 Id. at 360 (majority opinion). 
 109 Id. at 361, 368 (emphasis added). 
 110 Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111 Convictions can also result in immigrant detention, inadmissibility, and lengthy bars to lawful 
reentry to the United States. Cade, Plea Bargain Crisis, supra note 47, at 1758–63, 1809–11. 
 112 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373. While Padilla by itself did not constitutionally mandate that the 
parties negotiate around unjust removals, the Court’s subsequent decisions in two other plea bargain 
cases, Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), at least 
suggest the possibility that defendants are constitutionally entitled to the going rate for plea deals in 
their jurisdiction. See Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083, 1105 
(2016); Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2660–65 (2013). Thus, 
at least in localities where immigration-specific plea bargaining becomes standard practice, defense 
attorneys who fail to competently engage in such bargaining may run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. 
Andrés Dae Keun Kwon, Defending Criminal(ized) “Aliens” After Padilla: Toward a More Holistic 
Public Immigration Defense in the Era of Crimmigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1034, 1062–65 (2016) 
(arguing that after Padilla, Lafler, and Frye, “defenders arguably have an affirmative duty to seek an 
immigration-safe plea and avoid or mitigate negative immigration consequences”); Roberts, supra, at 
2668. 
 113 See Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice for 
Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (2012) (arguing that Padilla also encourages prosecutors to 
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In another recent series of cases, the Court has required and refined a 
“categorical approach” to determining the immigration consequences of 
convictions.114 In general, these cases have rejected the federal 
government’s efforts to expansively interpret the categories of crimes that 
lead to deportation in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), instead 
requiring a strict categorical match between the elements of the penal 
offense that the noncitizen was convicted of and the relevant immigration 
statutory provision.115 The categorical approach cases, the Court has 
explicitly acknowledged, allow noncitizens “to enter ‘safe harbor guilty 
pleas’” that preserve narrow possibilities for equitable relief in immigration 
court or sometimes avoid immigration sanctions altogether.116 This line of 
jurisprudence works hand-in-glove with Padilla, reinforcing the ability of 
subfederal actors to consider downstream consequences and constrain the 
application of a harsh and rigid immigration code. 
Considered together, the Court’s immigration enforcement 
jurisprudence over the last fifteen years “recognizes, and attempts to 
structure, the critical role that enforcement discretion plays in the modern 
deportation system.”117 The Court’s recent rulings in this area—the vast 
majority of which aim to protect the liberty interests of noncitizens within 
the United States—evince concern with the severity and inflexibility of the 
immigration code, particularly with respect to minor offenses leading to 
deportation.118 This jurisprudence reflects the notion that resident 
noncitizens’ claims to membership in the United States community can be 
broader than allowed by current code law, and accordingly, affiliation 
circumstances such as family ties and community contributions are 
 
agree to immigration-safe consequences in appropriate cases); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for 
Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1151 (2013) 
(discussing various prosecutorial policies that benefit noncitizen defendants); Robert M. A. Johnson, A 
Prosecutor’s Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011) 
(same); Kwon, supra note 112, at 1100–01 (same); see also Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 269 
(2012) (noting that defense attorneys might help noncitizens who travel abroad avoid inadmissibility 
problems upon return by plea bargaining to immigration-safe convictions). 
 114 See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 
190 (2013); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 577 n.11 (2010); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 
47, 59–60 (2006). 
 115 Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1060–69; Alina Das, The Immigration 
Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1669, 1700–01 (2011); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better Than the Sum: A Case for the 
Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
257, 261–62 (2012); Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical 
Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 996 (2008). 
 116 Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1987 (quoting Koh, supra note 115, at 307). 
 117 Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1093. 
 118 Id. at 1093–1100. 
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appropriately considered by both federal and state actors in order to avoid 
unjust removals.119 Of particular importance to sanctuary activities, these 
rulings also envision an increasing role for subfederal actors in maintaining 
the fairness and legitimacy of the overall removal system, even with 
respect to noncitizens deportable for civil or criminal violations. 
II. THE RISE AND RETREAT OF EQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 
Part I made the case that a mass, indiscriminate approach to 
enforcement is out of step with the context and history of the deportation 
system, which the Supreme Court has endeavored to structure in ways that 
continue to promote equitable considerations. This Part outlines the ways 
that the Administrations of George W. Bush and, particularly, Barack 
Obama undertook the responsibility to implement enforcement-based 
equity in the removal system. While various features of those efforts were 
susceptible to criticism, the key point is that for over sixteen years they 
reified the necessity—and legality—of using discretion to inject a measure 
of justice and proportionality into deportation decisions. This recent 
historical context helps lay bare the aberrational significance of the blind 
crackdown currently being implemented by the Trump Administration, 
which I turn to in Section II.C. 
A. The Bush Administration’s Solid Beginnings 
Although immigration agencies have utilized discretionary policies in 
some form since at least the late 1970s, it was not until the turn of the 
century that they began to more systematically implement equitable 
enforcement guidelines.120 The aforementioned congressional letter to INS 
in 1999, which urged more refined judgment in enforcement decisions, 
appears to have been the catalyst for action.121 In 2000, INS Commissioner 
Doris Meissner distributed an agency memo that became a lasting blueprint 
for the use of prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement.122 The 
Meissner Memo instructed agency managers to “plan and design operations 
 
 119 See MOTOMURA, supra note 67, at 110–11 (outlining a theory of immigrant inclusion called 
“immigration as affiliation”); Cade, supra note 31, at 1095–1100 (explaining how the Court’s 
understanding of immigration law incorporates the view that removal decisions should account for 
affiliation circumstances, despite the fact that current statutory law provides insufficient mechanisms 
for adjudicative consideration of such factors). 
 120 See generally SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 14–32 (2015) (chronicling the history of 
immigration prosecutorial discretion from 1975 to 2007). 
 121 Letter to Reno, supra note 75 (noting “widespread agreement” that rigid adherence to the 1996 
immigration laws had “resulted in unjustifiable hardship” in sympathetic cases). 
 122 See WADHIA, supra note 120, at 24 (describing the Meissner memo as “the gold standard”). 
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to maximize the likelihood that serious offenders will be identified,”123 
emphasized an expectation of fair and consistent discretionary judgments at 
every stage of the enforcement process,124 and detailed a nonexhaustive list 
of humanitarian factors that immigration officers should consider when 
evaluating whether to exercise favorable discretion.125 
The development of prosecutorial discretion standards continued after 
the INS was dissolved in 2003 to create the Department of Homeland 
Security and its subagencies. Agency memos issued that year instructed 
officers to adhere to the Meissner Memo and, in particular, to consider 
forgoing removal actions against certain noncitizens who have a path to 
lawful status.126 In 2005, the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor for ICE 
issued guidance to the chief counsel for each ICE regional office, further 
refining scenarios for the “favorable” use of discretion, and emphasizing 
that “[p]rosecutorial discretion is a very significant tool . . . to deal with the 
difficult, complex and contradictory provisions of the immigration laws 
and cases involving human suffering and hardship.”127 Moderate expansion 
of immigration prosecutorial discretion guidance continued throughout the 
remaining years of the George W. Bush Administration.128 
 
 123 Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, INS, to Reg’l Dirs. et al., INS, Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion 4–5 (Nov. 17, 2000), http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/IMM-Memo-ProsDiscretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/G336-F63W]. 
 124 Id. at 1. 
 125 Id. at 7–8 (listing immigration history, length of residence, criminal history, humanitarian 
concerns, military service, eligibility for a path to status, effect on future inadmissibility, community 
attention, available enforcement resources, and other discretionary factors). 
 126 Memorandum from Johnny N. Williams, Exec. Assoc. Comm’r of the Office of Field 
Operations, INS, to Reg’l Dirs. et al., INS, Unlawful Presence (June 12, 2002), 
http://www.asistahelp.org/documents/ 
resources/CIS_DA_is_not_UP_8A0BF46109B93.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB32-VZJK] (requiring 
attention to humanitarian factors when determining whether to undertake enforcement against 
unlawfully present noncitizens who are also eligible for immigration benefits); Memorandum from 
William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, U.S. Citizen & Immigration Servs., to Reg’l Dirs. & 
Serv. Ctr. Dirs., U.S. Citizen & Immigration Servs., Service Center Issuance of Notice to Appear (Form 
I-862) (Sept. 12, 2013) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review) (requiring continued 
adherence to the Meissner Memo). 
 127 Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, to All Chief Counsel, 
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, Prosecutorial Discretion 2–6, 8 (Oct. 24, 2005), 
https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/47955 [https://perma.cc/FL4P-2PLG]. 
 128 See Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec’y, ICE, to All Field Office Dirs. & 
Special Agents in Charge, ICE, Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion (Nov. 7, 2007), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/custody-pd.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH32-PSAV] 
(reaffirming the Meissner Memo and instructing agents to release nursing mothers from detention on 
discretionary grounds except in circumstances implicating public safety); Memorandum from John P. 
Torres, Dir., ICE, to Assistant Dirs. et al., ICE, Discretion in Cases of Extreme or Severe Medical 
Concern (Dec. 11, 2006), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/ 
discretionincasesofextremeorseveremedicalconcerndec112006.pdf [https://perma.cc/F66N-EVK6] 
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B. The Obama Administration’s Expansion and Refinement 
President Obama’s Administration even more explicitly 
acknowledged the necessity of enforcement-based equity in a system 
marked by extreme statutory rigidity.129 Indeed, when it became clear a few 
years into President Obama’s first term that Congress would be unable to 
enact immigration reform,130 DHS undertook significant efforts to 
systematize the use of prosecutorial discretion. In 2011, ICE began to roll 
out a series of agency initiatives geared toward more consistent use of 
equitable discretion.131 These efforts included trainings, numerous guidance 
documents, and public dissemination of transparent enforcement 
priorities.132 During President Obama’s two terms, the focus remained on 
 
(instructing ICE officers to consider favorable discretion when deciding whether to detain noncitizens 
with serious medical conditions). 
 129 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 683–86 (describing the Obama 
Administration’s acknowledgment, in litigation and public statements, of its responsibility to ensure 
that deportation operates in a fair and proportionate manner). 
 130 See, e.g., David Jackson, Obama Talks Immigration With Officials -- But No Members of 
Congress, USA TODAY (Apr. 19, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/ 
post/2011/04/obama-talks-immigration-with-officials----but-no-members-of-congress/1#. 
WzTN8hJKjVo [https://perma.cc/UFG2-5REN]; Julie Mason, Obama Pushes Immigration Overhaul, 
POLITICO (published May 10, 2011, 4:53 PM; updated May 10, 2011, 6:57 PM), https://www.politico. 
com/story/2011/05/obama-pushes-immigration-overhaul-054696 [https://perma.cc/K75G-RA7C]. 
 131 See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Emps., ICE, Civil Immigration 
Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7QA-
7KHF]; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office Dirs. et al., ICE, Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency 
for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Aliens 4–5 (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3FVQ-MPKE] [hereinafter Memorandum from John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion]. 
 132 See, e.g., Guidance to ICE Attorneys Reviewing the CBP, USCIS, and ICE Cases Before the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/guidance-
to-ice-attorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3U2-NAHW]; Next Steps 
in the Implementation of the Prosecutorial Discretion Memorandum and the August 18th 
Announcement on Immigration Enforcement Priorities, ICE, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ 
ero/pdf/pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG6L-Y9QT]; Memorandum from Jeh Charles 
Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., ICE, et al., 
Secure Communities (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_ 
secure_communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ5F-NQHV]; Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. 
Assoc. Dir., ICE, et al., to All Field Office Dirs. et al., ICE, Applicability of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Memoranda to Certain Family Relationships (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.immigrationequality.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/PD-memo-10-5-2012-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3NY-NGZZ]; Memorandum 
from John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 131; Memorandum from John 
Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office Dirs. et al., ICE, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, 
Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/ 
prosecutorial-discretion/certain-victims-witnesses-plaintiffs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EHP-MMJS]; 
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encouraging front-line operatives to consistently use the agency’s limited 
resources to target noncitizens with a criminal history or significant 
immigration violations and to forbear enforcement in cases with 
compelling humanitarian factors.133 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), announced in 2012, 
represented the agency’s attempt to shift toward systematic and categorical 
implementation of enforcement discretion.134 DACA focused on one of the 
most sympathetic groups of undocumented noncitizens—longtime 
residents who were brought to the United States at a young age, 
demonstrated a strong potential for economic productivity, and lacked 
indicia of dangerousness or wrongdoing.135 Such individuals had been 
deeply acculturated as Americans and were largely considered to bear little 
or no personal culpability in their past violations of immigration laws.136 
The DACA program allowed those who met the specified criteria to 
affirmatively present themselves to a unit within USCIS for “targeted 
consideration of their eligibility for equitable balancing,” with favorable 
action resulting in deferred action and, possibly, employment 
authorization.137 For many observers, the lack of any path to lawful status 
 
Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, to All Chief Counsel, Office of the 
Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, Case-by-Case Review of Incoming and Certain Pending Cases (Nov. 17, 
2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain-
pending-cases-memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP6E-T8GD]; Policy Memorandum, U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Revised Guidance for the Referral of Cases and Issuance of Notices 
to Appear (NTAs) in Cases Involving Inadmissible and Removable Aliens (Nov. 7, 2011), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/ 
NTA%20PM%20%28Approved%20as%20final%2011-7-11%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TTC-7T5D]. 
 133 See generally WADHIA, supra note 120, at 88–104 (describing the Obama Administration’s 
prosecutorial discretion policies with respect to immigration enforcement). 
 134 See Julia Preston & John H. Cushman Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), https://nyti.ms/OQZY77 [https://perma.cc/N3V3-ZT7D]. 
 135 See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-
daca [https://perma.cc/R8VR-8RV7] [hereinafter Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals]; 
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-
as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/9QDW-3GTC]. 
 136 See Ronald Brownstein, Poll: Public Prefers Citizenship for Dreamers, ATLANTIC (May 9, 
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/poll-public-prefers-citizenship-for-
dreamers/427329 [https://perma.cc/VY3Y-RZC5]; Jennifer De Pinto et al., Most Americans Support 
DACA, but Oppose Border Wall - CBS News Poll, CBS NEWS (published Jan. 18, 2018, 7:00 AM; 
updated Jan. 20, 2018, 12:37 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-americans-support-daca-but-
oppose-border-wall-cbs-news-poll [https://perma.cc/8ZZK-EZV5]. 
 137 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 694–95. Deferred action is “a revocable 
assurance that they are not going to be a priority for deportation.” Id. at 694. 
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for these hard-working, law-abiding youth, who know only this country, 
brought the current system’s unforgiving harshness into sharp relief.138 
Although controversial for its programmatic nature,139 DACA brought a 
large dose of transparency and consistency to the implementation of 
immigration enforcement discretion, at least with respect to one category of 
highly sympathetic noncitizens.140 
During this time, DHS also prioritized enforcement against two 
particular groups of noncitizens: recent border crossers and those who 
encounter criminal justice systems. Although not all deportations of 
persons within these categories satisfy proportionality concerns, 
prioritizing limited resources in this way lessened the likelihood of 
enforcement against nontargeted groups, for whom significant equitable 
claims are often present. Specifically, noncitizens who have already been 
living in the United States for some time, and who have avoided a criminal 
record, are more likely to have developed ties and relationships militating 
against removal.141 As a result of this strategy, border removals under the 
 
 138 See generally id. at 696–97 (arguing and citing sources for the point that DACA recipients’ 
“personal mitigating factors point toward lack of (or significantly diminished) culpability, full 
acculturation as Americans, strong community ties, [and] high potential for economic productivity,” 
and that therefore “concerns about equity loom especially large”); MOTOMURA, supra note 67, at 176 
(same); Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis 
for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58, 92 (2015) (arguing that 
“individuals eligible for DACA, as individuals who ‘were brought to this country as children’ without 
any ‘intent to violate the law,’ arguably might be more likely to have stronger positive equities simply 
by definition”). 
 139 See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 119 (2014) (“While 
prosecutorial discretion is a touchstone of immigration law, it cannot bear DACA’s weight. 
Prosecutorial discretion to grant deferred removal has typically functioned as a palliative measure after 
a noncitizen has been apprehended and placed in immigration proceedings. DACA, in contrast, 
establishes an affirmative immigration benefit that noncitizens can apply for just as they can seek 
asylum or other relief.” (footnote omitted)); Price, supra note 62, at 761 (“Yet declining to prioritize 
certain cases, as the executive branch might properly have done, may have very different effects from 
an announced, categorical policy like DACA. While the former preserves the deterrent effect of federal 
statutes by leaving all individuals covered by the statute in some jeopardy, the latter removes the risk of 
enforcement altogether.”). 
 140 MOTOMURA, supra note 67, at 176; Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 
694–98; Kalhan, supra note 138, at 66; Hiroshi Motomura, The President’s Dilemma: Executive 
Authority, Enforcement, and the Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 22 (2015–
2016); see also Letter from 136 Law Professors and Scholars to the President, Executive Authority to 
Protect Individuals or Groups from Deportation (Sept. 3, 2014), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Law-
Professor-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5QX-KDG8] (outlining the Executive’s authority to use 
discretion to protect individuals or groups from deportation). 
 141 See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 96–114 (2006) (outlining the history in immigration law of 
“affiliation-based safe harbors” that accrue through extended presence inside the United States and the 
development of due process norms aimed at protecting noncitizens who have developed ties from 
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Obama Administration dramatically increased as a percentage of overall 
removals—constituting about 66% between 2012 and 2015.142 Similarly, 
nearly half of deportees in that era had at least some kind of criminal 
history.143 
While these measures represented substantial efforts to implement 
equitable discretion, many scholars, advocates, and courts viewed DHS’s 
enforcement approach during this time to be overly coarse, particularly 
with respect to noncitizens with a criminal history. President Obama, like 
the administrations that preceded him, largely ignored equitable 
considerations for persons with convictions and instead “used criminal 
history of almost any type as an irrevocable marker of undesirability.”144 
Indeed, the majority of those whom the Obama-era DHS labeled “criminal 
aliens” had been convicted only of traffic offenses, low-level drug 
possession, crimes of migration (illegal entry or re-entry), or other minor 
offenses.145 ICE officers and attorneys denied leniency in most cases 
 
executive overreach); MOTOMURA, supra note 67, at 111 (“[A]ffiliation arguments grow in strength as 
unauthorized migrants develop ties and make contributions to American society over time.”); Juliet P. 
Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705 (2011) 
(explaining how noncitizens develop equities over time). 
 142 See FY 2015 ICE Immigration Removals, ICE, https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/2015 
[https://perma.cc/N34T-M4M3] (showing that border deportations constituted at least two thirds of all 
removal orders from 2012 to 2015). 
 143 Id. (showing that over half of deported persons in each year from 2010 to 2015 had some kind 
of criminal conviction). By way of comparison, according to government statistics, DHS removed a 
total of 2,011,630 immigrants under the George W. Bush Administration, of which only 710,242, or 
35%, had some kind of criminal history. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 96–104 (2009), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/APZ2-MR7G] (presenting data on 
removals from years 2001–2008). 
 144 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 700; see also Cade, supra note 32, at 
42–44; Eagly, supra note 113, at 1126, 1145–46. 
 145 MARC R. ROSENBLUM & KRISTEN MCCABE, MIGRATION POLICY INST., DEPORTATION AND 
DISCRETION: REVIEWING THE RECORD AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 19–20, tbl.B-3, app. C (2014), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-and-discretion-reviewing-record-and-options-
change [https://perma.cc/3ANP-HQAA] (indicating that 61% of interior removals in FY 2013 consisted 
of persons with no criminal record whatsoever or whose most serious offense was immigration 
offenses, traffic offenses, simple drug possession, or other nonviolent, nonserious crimes); MARC R. 
ROSENBLUM & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE DEPORTATION DILEMMA: 
RECONCILING TOUGH AND HUMANE ENFORCEMENT 6 (2014), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-dilemma-reconciling-tough-humane-enforcement 
[https://perma.cc/22RU-8HAT] (“At the same time, most of the recent shift from noncriminal to 
criminal removals has been driven by increased removals of people convicted exclusively of 
immigration-related crimes.”); Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 705 (“More than 
a quarter of all noncitizens deported after local criminal arrest have never been convicted of any crime 
at all.”); Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. REV. 594, 645 
(2016) (“The creation and consolidation of the significant misdemeanor category creates wider nets by 
expanding the pool of people who are properly labeled criminal aliens.”); Eagly, supra note 113, at 
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involving noncitizens with any criminal history and consistently sought the 
broadest and most severe interpretations of criminal removal statutes 
possible, even in the face of repeated reversals by the Supreme Court.146 
Additionally, under President Obama, the immigration agencies vastly 
increased the use of fast-track removal mechanisms such as expedited 
removal,147 reinstatement of removal,148 and administrative removal,149 all 
of which bypass immigration court adjudication. In fact, these measures 
accounted for more than 83% of total removals in 2013 and 2014.150 As 
Professor Jennifer Koh has argued, the fact that these kinds of procedures 
lack even the limited procedural protections available in immigration court 
casts doubt on their ability to reach accurate and consistent outcomes.151 
In sum, immigration enforcement during the Obama Administration 
was a mixed bag. At the same time that this period saw significant 
expansion and refinement of discretionary measures intended to bring more 
fairness and proportionality into the removal system, the agency’s approach 
toward noncitizens with criminal histories lacked sufficient nuance and the 
Administration effectuated more formal deportations than any previous 
administration. 
C. The Trump Administration’s Retreat 
It is some indication of the highly sympathetic circumstances of 
DACA-eligible youth that President Trump waited seven months to 
announce the end of the discretionary program.152 But even these 800,000 
 
1140–46 (explaining that “the criminal alien category includes all noncitizens convicted of crimes—
from misdemeanors to serious felonies” and graphically illustrating recent immigration enforcement in 
practice). 
 146 See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 206 (2013) (“This is the third time in seven years 
that we have considered whether the Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as 
‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an ‘aggravated felony.’ Once again we hold that 
the Government’s approach defies ‘the commonsense conception’ of these terms.” (quoting Carachuri-
Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 573 (2010))). See generally Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra 
note 31, at 1060–69 (discussing the Court’s recent categorical approach cases in the immigration 
context). 
 147 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (allowing immigration officials at the border to issue 
removal orders). 
 148 Id. § 1231(a)(5) (allowing immigration officials to re-execute a prior removal order where the 
noncitizen unlawfully reenters the United States). 
 149 Id. § 1228(b)(2)(B) (allowing immigration officials to process noncitizens who lack lawful 
permanent resident status in fast-track proceedings with weaker procedural and substantive protections 
and no oversight by a neutral immigration judge). 
 150 Koh, supra note 25, at 184 (citing statistics from the Department of Homeland Security). 
 151 Id. at 222–31. 
 152 See Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls on 
Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-
daca-dreamers-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/V4SV-FL6Q]. 
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exceptional young people—now working jobs, paying taxes, serving in the 
military, and studying in colleges and universities across the country—
could not inspire the current Administration to take a humanitarian 
approach with respect to their continued presence in the United States.153 
As of this writing, two federal district courts have found error in the 
manner in which DHS ended the DACA program, leading to its temporary 
reinstatement.154 Ultimately, however, the fate of these young people will 
rest in the hands of the political branches. 
The new Administration rapidly began changing the federal 
government’s enforcement approach in other respects. Then-DHS 
Secretary Kelly issued memoranda at the outset of his appointment that 
wholly abandoned the Obama-era prosecutorial discretion guidelines as 
agency-wide policy.155 The Administration immediately began to ramp up 
enforcement measures and rhetoric against all deportable noncitizens, 
regardless of their equities or any mitigating circumstances.156 In a 
February 2017 memo, for example, ICE Associate Director Matthew 
Albence instructed his 5700 deportation officers to “take enforcement 
action against all removable aliens encountered in the course of their 
duties.”157 Likewise, ICE trial attorneys have been told not to exercise 
 
 153 See, e.g., Ike Brannon & Logan Albright, The Economic and Fiscal Impact of Repealing DACA, 
CATO AT LIBERTY (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/economic-fiscal-impact-
repealing-daca [https://perma.cc/2QCF-MVRV] (reporting that the fiscal cost of deporting every DACA 
recipient would be “a $280 billion reduction in economic growth over the next decade”); Tom K. Wong 
et al., DACA Recipients’ Economic and Educational Gains Continue to Grow, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Aug. 28, 2017, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/ 
2017/08/28/437956/daca-recipients-economic-educational-gains-continue-grow 
[https://perma.cc/594A-JWCE] (“The survey’s results also show that at least 72 percent of the top 25 
Fortune 500 companies employ DACA recipients. Moreover, 97 percent of respondents are currently 
employed or enrolled in school.”). 
 154 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1037, 
1046 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their claim that the rescission 
was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”), aff’d, 
2018 WL 5833232 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2018); Alan Feuer, Second Federal Judge Issues Injunction to 
Keep DACA in Place, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/nyregion/daca-dreamers-injunction-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/V3LS-MHS4] (“In his ruling, Judge Garaufis agreed with the lawyers that the rollback 
was arbitrary and capricious . . . .”). Appeals of these and related decisions are pending, but as of this 
writing the district courts’ orders to process DACA renewals remain in effect. For updates on pending 
DACA litigation, see Status of Current DACA Litigation, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (Sept. 6, 
2018), https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/status-current-daca-litigation [https://perma.cc/9KM5-WC9M]. 
 155 Kelly, Priorities Memo, supra note 8. 
 156 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 157 Memorandum from Matthew T. Albence, Exec. Assoc. Dir., ICE, to All ERO Employees, ICE, 
Implementing the President’s Border Security and Interior Immigration Enforcement 
Policies (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3889695-
doc00801320170630123624.html [https://perma.cc/8588-UVXA]; see also Raymond, supra note 15 
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discretion in removal proceedings even for persons with time-delayed paths 
to lawful status, such as those with pending U status applications or 
beneficiaries of family-based petitions awaiting U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudication of provisional hardship 
waivers.158 Further, DHS has broadened its conception of “criminal aliens” 
for purposes of establishing removal priorities, sweeping in noncitizens 
merely arrested but not yet convicted of any crime.159 
This hard tack was no mere rhetoric. From February to December of 
2017, ICE made 143,000 arrests for civil immigration violations, a 42% 
increase from 2016.160 During that period ICE increased its detention of 
noncitizens without any criminal history by 250%.161 ICE agents have 
conducted extensive home raids around the country,162 entered courthouses 
 
(quoting ICE Acting Director Thomas Homan as making clear the agency’s position that “[t]here’s no 
population off the table. If you’re in this country illegally, we’re looking for you and we’re going to 
look to apprehend you”). 
 158 See Minutes for AILA/ICE Liaison Meeting on October 26, 2017, AILA Doc. No. 18011132, at 
2–4 (Jan. 11, 2018) (containing an official statement from the agency that ICE Trial Attorneys “should 
not administratively close cases where applications are pending with other agencies,” including Special 
Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) filings, U visas, and unaccompanied child asylum applications) (on file with 
Northwestern University Law Review). Hardship waivers can help relatives of U.S. citizens or LPRs 
overcome a ten-year bar on lawful admission due to prior unauthorized presence in the United States. 
Id. at 11. 
 159 See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 30, 2017); Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Security, to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., 
Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Policies (Feb. 20, 2017),  
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-
Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS5Q-7ESL] 
[hereinafter Kelly, Implementation Memo]. 
 160 Raymond, supra note 15. 
 161 Id.; see also Marcelo Rochabrun, ICE Officers Told to Take Action Against All Undocumented 
Immigrants Encountered While on Duty, PROPUBLICA (July 7, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/ice-officers-told-to-take-action-against-all-undocumented-
immigrants-encountered-while-on-duty [https://perma.cc/PM7Z-XLF7] (“Between February and May, 
the Trump Administration arrested, on average, 108 undocumented immigrants a day with no criminal 
record, an uptick of some 150 percent from the same time period a year ago.” (citation omitted)); Maria 
Sacchetti & Ed O’Keefe, ICE Data Shows Half of Immigrants Arrested in Raids had Traffic 
Convictions or No Record, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-
issues/ice-data-shows-half-of-immigrants-arrested-in-raids-had-traffic-convictions-or-no-record/2017/ 
04/28/81ff7284-2c59-11e7-b605-33413c691853_story.html [https://perma.cc/PM7Z-XLF7] (“About 
half of the 675 immigrants picked up in roundups across the United States in the days after President 
Trump took office either had no criminal convictions or had committed traffic offenses, mostly drunken 
driving, as their most serious crimes.”). 
 162 Lisa Rein et al., Federal Agents Conduct Immigration Enforcement Raids in at Least Six States, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-agents-conduct-
sweeping-immigration-enforcement-raids-in-at-least-6-states/2017/02/10/4b9f443a-efc8-11e6-b4ff-
ac2cf509efe5_story.html [https://perma.cc/8RX8-BVHQ] (reporting on ICE raids in Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Atlanta, North Carolina, South Carolina, and New York). 
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and hospitals to apprehend victims and witnesses believed to be 
deportable,163 and targeted caregivers of U.S. citizens.164 The agency has 
also significantly ramped up its use of immigration detainer requests for 
arrestees165 as well as the detention of individuals with prior stays of 
removal who have stayed out of trouble, supported their families, and 
faithfully shown up to annual immigration check-ins for years.166 Even 
 
 163 See, e.g., Barbara Demick, Federal Agents in Texas Move Hospitalized Salvadoran Woman 
Awaiting Emergency Surgery to a Detention Facility, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-hospital-seizure-20170223-story.html [https://perma.cc/8RX8-
BVHQ]; Azi Paybarah, Law Enforcement, Court Officials Differ on Impact of ICE Courthouse Arrests, 
POLITICO (Aug. 3, 2017, 5:39 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-
york/albany/story/2017/08/03/law-enforcement-court-officials-differ-on-impact-of-ice-courthouse-
arrests-113781 [https://perma.cc/79M2-L2DF] (“Federal immigration officials are hampering the 
business of courts by targeting witnesses and victims of crimes for deportation, the New York State 
Attorney General and acting Brooklyn District Attorney said Thursday.”); Letter From Tani G. Cantil-
Sakauye, Chief Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, to Attorney Gen. Jeff Sessions & John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dept. of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/chief-justice-cantil-
sakauye-objects-to-immigration-enforcement-tactics-at-california-courthouses [https://perma.cc/9N6V-
R6U7] (“Courthouses should not be used as bait in the necessary enforcement of our country’s 
immigration laws.”); see also ICE, DIRECTIVE NO. 11072.1, CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS INSIDE COURTHOUSES (2018), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Document/2018/ciEnforcementActionsCourthouses.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XND-VVAK] (defending 
and providing guidance for continued immigration enforcement efforts at courthouses). 
 164 Caitlin Dickerson, Trump Administration Targets Parents in New Immigration Crackdown, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/us/trump-arrest-undocumented-
immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/X9U2-GQEZ]; Katie Honan, 2 Queens Teens Beg ICE Not to 
Deport Father Who Sought Political Asylum, DNA INFO (Oct. 10, 2017, 4:44 PM), 
https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20171010/jackson-heights/bablu-sharif-ice-queens-detention-
deportation-president-trump [https://perma.cc/QNA4-RGXV]; Michael Sangiacomo, Caregiver to 
Severely Handicapped Stepson to be Deported Again (Photos), PLAIN DEALER (published Sept. 25, 
2017; updated Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/09/caregiver_to_ 
severely_handicap.html [https://perma.cc/S43X-N76Q] (describing the Trump Administration’s 
decision to deport a man who has provided critical care for fourteen years to his son with cerebral palsy 
and mental disabilities, despite a stay granted in 2015 by the Obama Administration). 
 165 Sacchetti, supra note 8 (documenting a 75% rise in number of detainer requests ICE sought for 
arrested noncitizens); Use of ICE Detainers: Obama vs. Trump, TRAC IMMIGRATION, (Aug. 30, 2017), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/479 [https://perma.cc/45AK-VSXK]. Whenever individuals are 
arrested, local authorities submit their fingerprints to the FBI to check for warrants. Pursuant to an 
interagency protocol, the prints are then automatically forwarded to DHS. If DHS databases indicate 
that the arrestee may be present in the United States without authorization (which is merely a civil 
violation), or removable for other civil or criminal violations, then DHS agents—or local officers 
deputized pursuant to 287(g) agreements—issue a detainer, asking the local law enforcement agency to 
hold the noncitizen for an additional forty-eight hours, facilitating federal agents’ ability to pick him or 
her up. Cade, supra note 47, at 1763–65. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012) (authorizing the 
Attorney General to enter into agreements with states and their subdivisions to carry out the functions 
of immigration officers, known as 287(g) agreements). 
 166 For an extensive roundup of media reports concerning recent enforcement actions that challenge 
notions of proportionality or fairness, see Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump ICE Age: Contextualizing 
the New Immigration Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253, 299–307 (2018); see also supra 
notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
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noncitizens seeking to take advantage of clear paths to lawful status may 
not be spared from adverse discretion and detention.167 There are 
indications that DHS is positioning itself to dramatically increase the use of 
both discretionary detention168 and rapid removal mechanisms.169 
To help effectuate this clampdown, the Trump Administration has 
renewed federal reliance on the assistance of state and local law 
enforcement agencies, including through the reanimation of programs such 
as 287(g) cooperative enforcement agreements,170 Secure Communities,171 
and the Criminal Alien Program.172 The programs differ, but each heavily 
relies on immigration detainers to allow federal authorities to take custody 
of noncitizens arrested by local police. The legality of continuing to 
confine persons based on detainer requests is hotly contested.173 
Nevertheless, many jurisdictions readily comply and, in other respects, 
embrace a cooperative role in federal immigration enforcement.174 
In short, the Trump Administration has taken a vigorous and 
indiscriminate approach to immigration enforcement, an approach that it 
 
 167 See, e.g., Cramer, supra note 9. 
 168 Clark Mindock, Trump Plans Massive Private Prison Expansion to Jail Undocumented 
Immigrants, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 18, 2017, 10:58 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ 
americas/us-politics/trump-prison-immigrants-expansion-undocumented-private-plans-ice-a8007876. 
html [https://perma.cc/D2N7-ZW8R]. 
 169 See, e.g., Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 
13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793, 8,796 (Jan. 30, 2017) (announcing expansion of the use of expedited 
removal proceedings); Kelly, Implementation Memo, supra note 159, at 6–7 (same); Memorandum 
from Attorney Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions to All Federal Prosecutors, Renewed Commitment to 
Criminal Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017) (instructing federal prosecutors to ramp up 
prosecutions for migration crimes and the corresponding tool of stipulated removals). See generally 
Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 263–64 (2017) 
(anticipating increased use of fast-track removal procedures, such as stipulated orders of removal, under 
the Trump Administration); Jennifer Lee Koh, Anticipating Expansion, Committing to Resistance: 
Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court Under Trump, 43 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 459, 459–60 
(2017) (same). 
 170 See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 30, 2017) (announcing that federal agencies will seek to enact 287(g) 
cooperative enforcement agreements with local authorities).  
 171 See id. at 8,801 (announcing that federal agencies will reinstate the Secure Communities 
program). 
 172 See Kelly, Priorities Memo, supra note 8, at 3 (“ICE should devote available resources to 
expanding the use of the Criminal Alien Program in any willing jurisdiction in the United States.”). 
 173 Courts have held that confinement solely on the basis of an immigration detainer violates the 
Fourth Amendment because detainer requests do not supply sufficient probable cause that a crime has 
been committed. See infra notes 194–98 and accompanying text. 
 174 See, e.g., Cade, supra note 47, at 1763–66; Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: 
Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for 
Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109; Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: 
Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1819 (2011). 
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believes states and cities must aid. Secretary Kelly explicitly declined any 
responsibility to impose considerations of equity on the statutorily rigid 
system: “If lawmakers do not like the laws they’ve passed and we are 
charged to enforce, then they should have the courage and skill to change 
the laws.”175 Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
summed up the new reality of immigration enforcement like this: 
“President Trump has claimed that his immigration policies would target 
the ‘bad hombres.’ The government’s decision to remove [a noncitizen 
petitioner with unusually compelling equities] shows that even the ‘good 
hombres’ are not safe.”176 
As I have argued, this mass enforcement approach is out of step with a 
contextual understanding of the deportation scheme. The rigidity and 
severity of the current statute require some measure of equitable 
enforcement discretion to maintain accuracy and fairness. Where local 
jurisdictions act to strengthen the federal government’s enforcement hand 
as cooperative force multipliers, these legitimacy norms are at even more 
risk.177 This context helps us grasp the role that sanctuary efforts now play 
in the deportation system, which the remainder of this Article will elaborate 
upon. 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF SANCTUARIES 
A variety of subfederal governments and institutions have 
implemented policies or undertaken actions that could be described as 
“sanctuary.” Sanctuary actors include both public entities (police 
departments, civil agencies, and public colleges), and private institutions 
(churches, synagogues, mosques, and universities).178 In broad terms, 
sanctuary efforts consist of state or local policies that increase the ability of 
deportable noncitizens to engage with government or community 
institutions without detection or apprehension by federal immigration 
authorities. Sanctuary efforts can also include the actions of public or 
 
 175 Devlin Barrett, DHS Secretary Kelly Says Congressional Critics Should ‘Shut Up’ or Change 
Laws, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dhs-
secretary-kelly-says-congressional-critics-should-shut-up-or-change-laws/2017/04/18/8a2a92b6-2454-
11e7-b503-9d616bd5a305_story.html [https://perma.cc/95HY-URN4]. 
 176 Ortiz v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 2017) (decrying ICE’s “inhumane” decision to 
remove a noncitizen who became a “pillar of his community” over three decades in the United States 
but finding no legal basis to halt the agency’s decision). I discuss this and other recent cases evaluating 
Trump Administration removal decisions elsewhere. See Cade, supra note 85. 
 177 Cf. Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 7 (“Moreover, even in a ‘dissenting’ role, where 
a private or local sanctuary is located in a decidedly anti-sanctuary state, these local and hyper-local 
expressions remain critical sites of resistance and norm-creation.”). 
 178 Villazor, supra note 21, at 137. 
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private entities that provide noncitizens with community aid, legal 
resources, or other assistance intended to help them access statutory or 
discretionary relief from removal, or at least to forestall deportation 
temporarily. My primary focus here is on the defensive measures taken by 
sanctuaries that either limit the access or information provided to federal 
immigration enforcers or that increase noncitizens’ removal defense 
resources.179 These kinds of activities most directly inject equity-
influencing dynamics into the current Administration’s mass deportation 
efforts. 
In this Part, I will briefly introduce each form of sanctuary and touch 
on the relevant legal and policy justifications for its activities. Although the 
legality disputes are not the focus of my analysis, the fact that each 
sanctuary action likely stands on legally sound footing contributes to its 
clout. Just as importantly, if sanctuaries are likely to weather challenges 
from the Executive Branch, they are better positioned to make a more 
lasting impact in the removal system. In Part IV, I will explain how 
sanctuaries work to foster legal and equitable norms in immigration 
decision-making processes. 
A. Sanctuary Cities 
A large and growing number of municipalities have enacted various 
forms of sanctuary policies.180 Much of the activity in this area has been 
concerned with federal data-sharing enforcement programs, through which 
federal officials identify potentially deportable noncitizens when they are 
booked into local jails and then issue detainers requesting that local 
authorities continue to detain such persons when they would otherwise be 
entitled to release.181 These sanctuary measures limit the circumstances in 
which local authorities will either (1) obtain and/or share information about 
the immigration status of noncitizens with federal immigration agencies, 
(2) detain noncitizens explicitly (and solely) for the purpose of facilitating 
federal enforcers to take them into federal custody, or (3) notify federal 
 
 179 See Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary 
Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 25–35 (2016) (describing a range of 
motivations behind state and local resistance to federal immigration enforcement policies). 
 180 See Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 42. 
 181 Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-Whistle Politics, 42 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 159, 161 (2016) (“The anti-detainer movement arose out of state and local resistance to 
the federal ‘Secure Communities’ program, which linked federal crime databases with federal 
immigration databases, allowing federal immigration officials to identify suspected immigration 
violators soon after their booking into a local jail. Secure Communities resulted in a ten-fold increase in 
the number of detainers placed, and advocates soon realized the battle against Secure Communities 
could be successfully waged by fighting the use of detainers.” (footnote omitted)); see supra note 170 
and accompanying text. 
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agents when such persons are being released from local detention.182 Many 
of the policies, it should be noted, contain explicit or de facto exceptions 
for persons with serious criminal histories, outstanding warrants, or other 
significant red flags.183 
Some of these municipal sanctuaries date back to the 1980s, arising in 
the context of the federal government’s dismal record of asylum 
adjudication for Central American refugees.184 More proliferated between 
the late 1990s and 2015 as some counties and cities began to resist DHS’s 
increasing prioritization of enforcement against noncitizens who encounter 
the criminal justice system and the agency’s attempts to co-opt local law 
enforcement into the identification and detention of potentially deportable 
noncitizens.185 As of December 2016, about 300 jurisdictions had adopted 
policies that in some way restrict the extent to which these cities and 
municipalities comply with immigration detainers or share information 
with immigration authorities.186 Similar state and local measures have 
continued to rapidly proliferate in the first year of the Trump 
Administration.187 Professor Chris Lasch and others have established an 
online library that tracks such policies.188 
 
 182 See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 
1736–48 (2018) (discussing various sanctuary city policies). 
 183 Id.; see also, e.g., S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (providing a range of exceptions 
based on criminal history to the state’s general prohibition on cooperation with immigration 
enforcement authorities); Julianne Hing, Despite ‘Sanctuary City’ Status, Chicago Police Feed Trump’s 
Deportation Machine, NATION (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/despite-sanctuary-
city-status-chicago-police-feed-trumps-deportation-machine [https://perma.cc/M6YC-XSJ7] 
(“Currently, the city permits its police officers to cooperate with federal immigration authorities’ 
requests to detain a person on their behalf if someone falls into one of four categories: if a person is in 
the city’s gang database, has an outstanding criminal warrant, is convicted of a felony, or has an open 
felony case.”). 
 184 Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good 
Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 252–59 (2012) (describing information-
limiting policies adopted in San Francisco and New York City in the 1980s); Lasch, supra note 181, at 
159–62 (briefly describing the history of the “Sanctuary City” from the 1980s to 2015). 
 185 Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and 
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1843 (2007); Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant Covering, 
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 765, 839 (2017) (“In 2008, approximately seventy local jurisdictions had 
prevented their law enforcement officials from inquiring into an individual’s immigration status or 
discriminating against persons on the basis of that status.”); Lasch, supra note 181, at 159–61; Cristina 
M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 601 
(2008). 
 186 Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1197, 1220 (citing reports about sanctuary jurisdictions). 
 187 Elias, supra note 185, at 816; Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”—Online Appendix: Policies 
Sorted by State, WESTMINSTER L. LIBR. (last updated Jun. 6, 2018, 11:55 AM), 
http://libguides.law.du.edu/c.php?g=705342&p=5008843 [https://perma.cc/329T-79T7]; see, e.g., 
DENVER, COLO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-250 (2018); Atlanta, Ga., Res. 17-R-4256 (Sept. 5, 2017), 
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Policymakers have raised a number of justifications for law 
enforcement sanctuary measures, which tend to focus on resource 
constraints, legal liability, and unintended secondary consequences for 
policing. In some jurisdictions, the articulated rationales also include 
fairness concerns.189 Chiefly, policymakers emphasize that such endeavors 
are critical to community policing and public safety.190 Assurances that 
police and other authorities will not provide immigration-related 
information to federal enforcers encourage victims and witnesses to come 
forward and report crimes, furthering safety goals for the entire 
community.191 Indeed, studies have suggested that sanctuary jurisdictions 
are safer than places without sanctuary measures, as measured by crime 




 188 Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”—Online Appendix: Policies Sorted by State, supra note 187. 
 189 Armacost, supra note 186, at 1199 (arguing that sanctuary policies are often designed “to 
address certain pathologies of a system in which local policing and immigration enforcement has 
become destructively intertwined”); Kristina M. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid Is Never a Crime? The 
Politics of Immigration Enforcement and the Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 71, 111–13 
(2012) (arguing that most sanctuary city policies have little to do with providing protection to 
deportable immigrants but instead are focused on general public safety); Chen, supra note 179, at 53–54 
(describing a range of motivations for sanctuary policies and resistance to federal immigration 
enforcement); Lasch et al., supra note 182, at 1752–73 (discussing a range of legal and policy rationales 
behind sanctuary city measures). 
 190 DORIS MARIE PROVINE ET AL., POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ON THE 
FRONT LINES 4 (2016) (“Helping to maintain a variety of approaches, however, is the tension between 
enforcement of immigration laws against law-abiding, but undocumented, residents and the principle of 
community policing based on trusting relationships with all residents in a community.”); Armacost, 
supra note 186, at 1250 (“Many state and local police departments complain that associating ordinary 
policing so closely with immigration enforcement—especially when it involves racial profiling and 
targets minor offenders—undermines trust between the police and immigrant communities.”); Elias, 
supra note 185, at 815 (explaining that sanctuary protocols are primarily motivated by public safety and 
economic concerns); Hing, supra note 184, at 297–308 (same); see, e.g., Senate Leader de León’s 
California Values Act Clears Legislature, SENATOR KEVIN DE LEÓN (Sept. 16, 2017), 
http://sd24.senate.ca.gov/news/2017-09-16-senate-leader-de-leons-california-values-act-clears-
legislature [https://perma.cc/3894-WUQS] (articulating both public safety and resistance to President 
Trump’s indiscriminate enforcement approach as reasons for supporting California sanctuary bill). 
 191 See, e.g., NIK THEODORE, DEP’T OF URBAN PLANNING & POLICY, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., 
INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 3 (2013); Jason A. Cade & Meghan L. Flanagan, Five Steps to a Better U: Improving 
the Crime-Fighting Visa, 21 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 85, 102–06, 109–11 (2018); Marjorie S. Zatz & 
Hilary Smith, Immigration, Crime, and Victimization: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
141, 150 (2012). 
 192 See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING 
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 251–60 (2012) (describing evidence that places with high concentrations of 
immigrants have lower crime rates); Tom K. Wong, The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the 
Economy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 26, 2017, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/01/26/297366/the-effects-of-
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creep in when law enforcement officers know that immigration 
enforcement is likely to follow an arrest regardless of whether a criminal 
prosecution will occur.193 
A second defense of law enforcement sanctuary measures rests on 
constitutional constraints and legal liability for violations.194 Many courts 
have held that extending a noncitizen’s custody solely on the basis of an 
immigration detainer violates the Fourth Amendment.195 Recently, a district 
court in Texas enjoined a state law requiring local authorities to comply 
with detainer requests, in part due to the likelihood that Fourth Amendment 
violations will result.196 Authority to arrest or detain requires probable 
cause or a judicially sanctioned warrant, and an immigration agent’s 
decision to issue a detainer provides neither.197 Relatedly, courts have held 
that immigration detainers are not mandatory (thus avoiding the Tenth 
Amendment’s anti-commandeering rule), and as a result, it is the local 
 
sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-economy [https://perma.cc/2JCE-8QR6] (“Crime is statistically 
significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to nonsanctuary counties.”). 
 193 See, e.g., INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS: A LEADERSHIP 
GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 153–91 (2006), 
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/PCR_LdrshpGde_Part3.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG4B-V687]. For 
an analysis of how the integration of immigration and criminal enforcement can lead to racial profiling 
and other policing distortions, see Armacost, supra note 186, at 1223–31; Cade, Policing the 
Immigration Police, supra note 78, at 184 (discussing connections between unconstitutional racial 
profiling and local enforcement agencies that prioritize the apprehension of immigrants); Cade, supra 
note 47, at 1757 (arguing that ICE’s integration with the criminal justice system, and in particular the 
misdemeanor system, can create corrosive feedback loops that undermine the reliability and integrity of 
both systems); Eagly, supra note 113, at 1150; Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 
844 (2015); Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination: The Racially Disparate 
Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 993, 1026 (2016); and Carrie L. 
Rosenbaum, The Natural Persistence of Racial Disparities in Crime-Based Removals, 13 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 532, 545 (2017). 
 194 Lasch, supra note 181; Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 26. 
 195 See, e.g., Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F. Supp. 3d 791, 807–08 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Miranda-
Olivares v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *5 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 
2014); Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29–34 (D.R.I. 2014), aff’d, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 
2015); Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10-cv-06815, 2012 WL 1080020 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012), rev’d on 
other grounds, 745 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2014); Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1156–60 
(Mass. 2017) (holding that local law enforcement lacks authority to continue detention of noncitizen 
solely for purposes of immigration enforcement). 
 196 City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 809 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“[T]he Court has found 
that enforcement of the mandatory detainer provisions will inevitably lead to Fourth Amendment 
violations.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018). On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit panel held that plaintiffs could only challenge Fourth Amendment violations resulting from 
detainers on a case-by-case basis. 890 F.3d at 185–90. 
 197 See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 510 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[C]ivil 
detainer requests are often not supported by an individualized determination of probable cause that a 
crime has been committed.”); Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 
(holding that ICE lacked statutory authority to detain without warrant in circumstances of that case 
absent a finding of flight risk before a warrant can be obtained). 
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agency that bears liability for any constitutional violations, rather than 
federal authorities.198 
A third set of reasons for sanctuary policies is fiscal. Localities 
complying with immigration detainer requests bear the cost of extended 
detention and are typically not fully reimbursed or compensated by the 
federal government.199 Moreover, time spent managing detainer requests is 
time away from other law enforcement tasks. Noncooperation or limited-
cooperation measures thus “preserve economic resources by limiting police 
expenditures to nonimmigration-related crimes and by ensuring that police 
personnel time is not expended on making immigration-related 
inquiries.”200 
In the face of threats by the Trump Administration to withhold federal 
funding from sanctuary jurisdictions,201 some jurisdictions obtained a 
preliminary nationwide injunction prohibiting the federal government from 
coercing cities and counties into assisting immigration authorities.202 There 
are two main components to the argument. First, the Executive Branch is 
limited in its ability to attach new conditions on congressionally authorized 
funding streams.203 Second, the federal government cannot 
unconstitutionally coerce states, municipalities, campuses, or private 
 
 198 See, e.g., Galarza, 745 F.3d at 640–41 (holding, along with the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth 
Circuits, that construing detainers as mandatory would violate the anti-commandeering rule of the 
Tenth Amendment); Villars, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 802; Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *5. 
 199 See, e.g., Hing, supra note 184, at 310–11. 
 200 Elias, supra note 185, at 815. 
 201 Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 30, 2017); Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Charlie Savage, White House to States: Shield the 
Undocumented and Lose Police Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/us/politics/sanctuary-cities-jeff-sessions.html 
[https://perma.cc/XH2R-BRQV]; Forrest G. Read IV, Trump Administration Stops Law Enforcement 
Funds to Chicago, Sanctuary City, and Gets Sued, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trump-administration-stops-law-enforcement-funds-to-chicago-
sanctuary-city-and-gets [https://perma.cc/79G5-JP6B] (reporting on Chicago’s lawsuit challenging the 
Trump Administration’s decision to condition JAG grants to law enforcement on local cooperation with 
immigration officials). 
 202 Vivian Yee, Judge Blocks Trump Effort to Withhold Money from Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/us/judge-blocks-trump-sanctuary-cities.html 
[https://perma.cc/K5ST-K7MT]; Joel Rubin, L.A. Looks to Join Fight Against Trump Administration 
over Threats to Withhold Anti-Crime Funds for ‘Sanctuary’ Cities, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017, 4:20 
PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sanctuary-city-lawsuit-20170822-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/67RB-65YE]. 
 203 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 296 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding lower court 
injunction against Trump Administration’s withholding of funds pursuant to access and notice 
conditions); Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary 
City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 573–80 (delineating the constitutional requirement that 
funding conditions be germane to Congress’s purpose and applying these principles to the Trump 
Administration’s efforts to curb sanctuary policies through funding restrictions). 
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institutions into assistance with matters that are squarely within the federal 
government’s domain.204 Conversely, law enforcement is a core police 
power, reserved to the states in our federal system.205 
A few cities have taken steps to ensure that noncitizen residents facing 
deportation have the assistance of legal counsel.206 In New York City, for 
example, all noncitizens who cannot afford an attorney are provided with 
representation through a combination of private and public funding 
sources.207 Measures like this can have a significant effect on immigration 
outcomes, as the assistance of counsel has been shown to be crucial in 
ensuring that noncitizens are able to defend against removal.208 Some states 
and cities have also implemented integrative sanctuary measures, such as 
the provision of drivers’ licenses or identity cards.209 While not my primary 
focus here, I briefly touch on the consequences of these kinds of 
immigrant-welcoming activities in Section IV.D. 
 
 204 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutionality of Withholding Federal Funds from 
Sanctuary Cities, L.A. LAW., Apr. 2017, at 60, 60. 
 205 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1451 (1987); Hing, 
supra note 184, at 273–80 (arguing that the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism protect state 
and local law enforcement decisions not to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement); cf. Jason 
A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 402–04 (2012) (arguing that federalism 
principles require an unequivocally clear statement from Congress that federal immigration officials can 
deport someone on the basis of a conviction that has been pardoned or expunged under state law). 
 206 Maura Ewing, Should Taxpayers Sponsor Attorneys for Undocumented Immigrants?, ATLANTIC 
(May 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/should-taxpayers-sponsor-
attorneys-for-undocumented-immigrants/525162 [https://perma.cc/GQ7M-TDSY] (discussing right-to-
counsel measures in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Washington, D.C., New York City, and 
Austin, as well as statewide initiatives on the table in New York and California); New York State 
Becomes First in the Nation to Provide Lawyers for All Immigrants Detained and Facing Deportation, 
VERA INST. (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.vera.org/newsroom/press-releases/new-york-state-becomes-
first-in-the-nation-to-provide-lawyers-for-all-immigrants-detained-and-facing-deportation 
[https://perma.cc/H5B2-P964]. 
 207 Liz Robbins & J. David Goodman, De Blasio and Council Agree, and Disagree, on Immigrants, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/nyregion/de-blasio-and-council-
agree-and-disagree-on-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/8LK8-UFH5]. 
 208 See infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text; cf. Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 
28–29 (“The provision of legal services may perhaps be a quintessential form of safe haven.”). 
 209 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12801.9 (West 2016) (allowing undocumented noncitizens to 
obtain driver’s licenses with proof of identity and state residence); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-
105.1 (West 2013) (allowing undocumented noncitizens to obtain driver’s licenses with proof of 
residency for at least one year); N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 3-115(d)(1)(vi) (2018) (allowing 
undocumented noncitizens to obtain city identification cards with proof of identity). 
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B. Sanctuary Churches 
Today’s religious sanctuaries are only the most recent iteration of a 
deep lineage dating back at least to biblical times.210 The most direct 
precedent is the Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s, which provided legal 
screening, shelter, and other assistance to refugees from El Salvador and 
Guatemala who were widely perceived to have been unfairly denied 
asylum.211 At its peak, the Movement consisted of over 100 churches and 
synagogues, with at least 20,000 individual participants or supporters 
engaged in the effort.212 Members of these congregations believed that the 
refugees faced fatal danger if returned to their home countries and felt 
compelled to help the federal government fulfill its obligations under 
domestic and international asylum law.213 
Professor Barbara Bezdek described that Sanctuary Movement as 
“civil initiative,” which she defined as the “conscientious practice of people 
joined by a faith-based understanding of the importance and possibility of 
responding to the sufferings of strangers, by enacting a way for society to 
comply with human rights laws although the Government persisted in 
violating them.”214 The federal government viewed these activities 
differently, however, ultimately prosecuting participants in the Movement 
for “harboring or transporting . . . aliens” in violation of Section 274 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).215 In 1989, some Sanctuary 
Movement members, including founder John Fife, were found guilty of 
 
 210 For accounts of earlier sanctuary movements, see, for example, Bezdek, supra note 22, at 928–
31; Kristina M. Campbell, Operation Sojourner: The Government Infiltration of the Sanctuary 
Movement in the 1980s and Its Legacy on the Modern Central American Refugee Crisis, 13 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 474 (2017). 
 211 See generally Villazor, supra note 21, at 138–42 (outlining the historical background of 
sanctuaries and highlighting the efforts of churches and individuals in the 1980s to offer assistance to 
Central American migrants believed to have been wrongly denied asylum by the United States); 
Gabrielle Emanuel, Religious Communities Continue the Long Tradition of Offering Sanctuary, NPR 
(Mar. 14, 2017, 4:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/14/519307698/religious-communities-
continue-the-long-tradition-of-offering-sanctuary [https://perma.cc/SY4N-LVMZ]. As part of a legal 
settlement, the federal government later admitted it had not properly adjudicated the asylees’ claims. 
See Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). See generally Campbell, 
supra note 189, at 101 (describing this history). 
 212 Kathleen L. Villarruel, Note, The Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement: A 
Comparison of History, Litigation, and Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1429, 1433 (1987). 
 213 See generally Bezdek, supra note 22, at 935–39 (describing the motivations behind this 
sanctuary movement); Campbell, supra note 210 (same); Villarruel, supra note 212, at 1433–34 (same). 
 214 Bezdek, supra note 22, at 911. 
 215 Id. at 902. The current harboring provision of the INA provides for criminal penalties for “[a]ny 
person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or 
remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or 
attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or 
any means of transportation.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
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violating this provision.216 None served jail time, however, and the 
Movement continued.217 Eventually, in separate but related litigation, the 
government conceded that its handling of the Central American asylum 
claims had been improper.218 
Now, in the face of the Trump Administration’s mass enforcement 
approach, more than 1000 churches, synagogues, and mosques throughout 
the country have loosely organized as the New Sanctuary Movement.219 
The New Sanctuary Movement has spread even to locations that 
historically had little or no involvement with sanctuary efforts or immigrant 
advocacy, such as Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Twin Cities, Iowa.220 
Congregations partaking in this Movement share a commitment to keeping 
the families of deportable noncitizens intact, particularly those that include 
U.S. citizen children. The forms of support vary. Most significantly, a 
number of churches have provided physical refuge to persons facing 
removal despite highly sympathetic circumstances. In some cases, these 
actions have influenced federal enforcers to exercise discretion to the 
 
 216 See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 217 See Clyde Haberman, Trump and the Battle over Sanctuary in America, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/05/us/sanctuary-cities-movement-1980s-political-asylum. 
html [https://perma.cc/3AJE-M45B]. 
 218 See Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (discussing 
settlement of litigation regarding the government’s improper handling of Central American asylum 
claims); see also Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 565–68 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming 
findings by the district court that INS violated the rights of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum 
applicants). 
 219 See MYRNA OROZCO & NOEL ANDERSEN, SANCTUARY IN THE AGE OF TRUMP: THE RISE OF 
THE MOVEMENT A YEAR INTO THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 6 (2018), https://www. 
sanctuarynotdeportation.org/uploads/7/6/9/1/76912017/sanctuary_in_the_age_of_trump_january_2018.
pdf [https://perma.cc/WH8J-PB9L] (“As of January 2018, there are more than 1,110 congregations in 
the Sanctuary Movement, showing the faith resistance continues to grow against harsh and inhumane 
immigration policies.” (emphasis omitted)); Ashley Archibald, Mosques, Churches, Synagogues, and 
Temples Rekindle the Sanctuary Movement to Protect Refugees and Immigrants from Deportation, 
REAL CHANGE NEWS (June 21, 2017), http://realchangenews.org/2017/06/21/mosques-churches-
synagogues-and-temples-rekindle-sanctuary-movement-protect-refugees-and [https://perma.cc/4NGM-
VGHW]; Sarah Quezada, How Churches Can Give Sanctuary and Still Support the Law, CHRISTIANITY 
TODAY (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.christianitytoday.com/women/2017/march/how-churches-can-
give-sanctuary-to-immigrants-and-still-sup.html [https://perma.cc/KS8E-297N]. This is a dramatic 
increase from 2013, when just over a dozen churches were known to provide sanctuary to 
undocumented families. Elizabeth Evans & Yonat Shimron, ‘Sanctuary Churches’ Vow to Shield 
Immigrants from Trump Crackdown, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://religionnews.com/2016/11/18/sanctuary-churches-vow-to-shield-immigrants-from-trump-
crackdown [https://perma.cc/YZG3-NSTL]. 
 220 Andrea Castillo, Churches Answer Call to Offer Immigrants Sanctuary in an Uneasy Mix of 
Politics and Compassion, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
sanctuary-churches-20170301-story.html [https://perma.cc/A88C-TWQ7]. 
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benefit of the noncitizen.221 Other less extreme but nevertheless important 
assistance regularly provided by church sanctuaries includes “know-your-
rights” trainings, legal consultations, or attorney representation.222 
Today’s religious sanctuary actors seek to avoid the legal liability that 
befell the earlier movement’s participants in part by providing sanctuary 
openly. In this way, they can argue that they are not actually concealing 
potentially deportable noncitizens.223 Moreover, the congregations 
acknowledge that ICE officials are lawfully entitled to carry out 
enforcement on church property so long as they have a valid warrant to do 
so.224 Indeed, congregations and participants in the New Sanctuary 
Movement have become savvy about the Fourth Amendment and related 
constitutional protections for private property.225 Thus far, ICE has adhered 
to longstanding agency policy not to conduct enforcement actions in 
churches and other “sensitive locations,”226 and no members of the New 
Sanctuary Movement have been prosecuted under the harboring provision 
of the INA.227 
 
 221 See, e.g., Etehad, supra note 3; Kyung Lah et al., Underground Network Readies Homes to Hide 
Undocumented Immigrants, CNN (Feb. 26, 2017, 8:46 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/23/us/california-immigrant-safe-houses/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
AG9N-MQVM]; see also infra note 283 (citing reports of sanctuary activities leading to favorable 
exercises of discretion). 
 222 See, e.g., Emily Fontenot, Why Are Churches Choosing to Provide Legal Services to 
Immigrants?, IMMIGR. ALLIANCE, http://theimmigrationalliance.org/churches-choosing-provide-legal-
services-immigrants [https://perma.cc/34AM-3ACV]; Christopher Smart, Leaked Document Offers 
Peek at How Church Helps Undocumented Immigrant Mormons, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 10, 2017, 
12:20 AM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=5006677&itype=CMSID [https://perma.cc/Q6HP-
249H] (“Congregational leaders in the LDS Church should provide welfare assistance to undocumented 
Mormon immigrants as they would to any other church member, according to a purported policy paper 
from the Utah-based faith.”). 
 223 See Quezada, supra note 219. 
 224 See, e.g., Manya Brachear Pashman, Cupich to Priests: No Entry for Immigration Agents 
Without Warrants, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 1, 2017, 5:30 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ 
breaking/ct-cardinal-cupich-immigration-directive-20170301-story.html [https://perma.cc/5587-VV5Z]. 
 225 See Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 20, at 20–21 (discussing a variety of legal strategies 
that churches have taken to maximize protection of noncitizens seeking sanctuary in their buildings). 
 226 See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 2, at 1 (indicating that as a policy matter ICE 
will not enforce immigration law in “sensitive locations” such as churches). 
 227 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). But see Ryan Devereaux, “We’re Gonna 
Take Everyone”—Border Patrol Targets Prominent Humanitarian Group As Criminal Organization, 
INTERCEPT (Apr. 30, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/04/30/were-gonna-take-everyone-
border-patrol-targets-prominent-humanitarian-group-as-criminal-organization [https://perma.cc/66TD-
E6JW] (reporting on arrest and lodging of federal harboring charges against Scott Warren, a volunteer 
with the Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson-affiliated organization No More Deaths, for providing 
aid to migrants near the border). 
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C. Sanctuary Campuses 
Sanctuary campuses are public or private institutions of higher 
learning that admit undocumented students228 and resist efforts by federal 
agents to obtain information about these students or to conduct 
enforcement activities on campus.229 As of this writing, about eighty 
campuses have adopted noncooperation policies.230 Around sixteen have 
officially declared themselves to be “sanctuary campuses.”231 More 
commonly, universities have simply implemented sanctuary-like measures, 
particularly policies that limit information sharing without a court order or 
deny federal enforcers campus access without a warrant.232 Although less 
frequent, public schools are another emerging sanctuary site.233 
 
 228 For examples of states allowing undocumented noncitizens to attend universities and, in some 
cases, qualify for in-state tuition, see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2018); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
305/7e-5 (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 85-502 
(West 2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-4.6 (West 2015); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6206 (McKinney 2018); 
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.052 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-8-106 (West 2002); and 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.15.012 (West 2018). A few states even allow unauthorized resident 
students to qualify for state scholarships to public universities. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66021.7 
(West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.92.010 (West 2014). 
 229 See generally Julia Preston, Campuses Wary of Offering ‘Sanctuary’ to Undocumented 
Students, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/education/edlife/sanctuary-
for-undocumented-students.html [https://perma.cc/QJU8-4424]. 
 230 Map of Sanctuary Campuses on Oct. 4, 2018, GOOGLE MAPS, 
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1LcIME474-lYWbTf_xQChIhSSN30&hl=en&ll=36. 
2039797443434%2C-113.89148150000005&z=3 [https://perma.cc/ZW4Q-2K7X] (mapping United 
States campuses with sanctuary policies and roughly coding the strength of their expressed 
commitment); see, e.g., Kathleen Megan, Wesleyan Declares Itself a Sanctuary Campus for 
Undocumented Immigrants, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.courant.com/education/hc-college--trump-sanctuary-1123-20161122-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/J5K2-L944] (reporting that Wesleyan University President Michael Roth publicly 
stated that Wesleyan “would not cooperate with any efforts to round up people, unless . . . forced to”). 
 231 Map of Sanctuary Campuses on Oct. 4, 2018, supra note 230; see, e.g., Chris Lydgate, Kroger 
Declares Reed a Sanctuary College, REED MAG. (Nov. 18, 2016, 11:14 AM), 
http://www.reed.edu/reed_magazine/sallyportal/posts/2016/sanctuary-college.html [https://perma.cc/ 
5VM4-RS6P]; Megan, supra note 230; Wim Wiewel, Portland State Is a Sanctuary University, INSIDE 
PSU, https://www.pdx.edu/insidepsu/portland-state-is-a-sanctuary-university [https://perma.cc/QBF8-
6M7T] (declaring Portland State University to be a sanctuary campus, by university president); 
Resolution No. 161215-IX-346, City Coll. of S.F. Bd. of Trs., City College of San Francisco Joins the 
City and County of San Francisco in Affirming Its Sanctuary Status for all People of San Francisco 
(Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.ccsf.edu/BOT/2016/December/346r.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLR9-9MYE]. 
 232 Map of Sanctuary Campuses on Oct. 4, 2018, supra note 230; see, e.g., Aaron Holmes, 
University to Provide Sanctuary, Financial Support for Undocumented Students, COLUM. SPECTATOR, 
(Nov. 22, 2016, 7:54 PM), https://www.columbiaspectator.com/news/2016/11/21/university-provide-
sanctuary-financial-support-undocumented-students [https://perma.cc/C6V8-M3ZY] (describing 
Columbia University’s policies not to allow immigration authorities on campus without a warrant or to 
share student information unless subpoenaed). 
 233 In May 2017, for example, an ICE agent attempted to apprehend a fourth grader at a public 
school in Queens, New York, but was turned away by school officials. Alex Eriksen, ICE Agent Tried 
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As with other sanctuary entities, such measures have not gone without 
controversy and challenge. Lawmakers have introduced bills, for instance, 
that would deprive sanctuary campuses of various sources of funding.234 
Moreover, public universities and colleges are administered by employees 
of the state, and accordingly, it is possible that federal immigration law 
restricts their ability to limit information sharing with federal enforcers.235 
Yet, as Professors Rose Cuison Villazor and Pratheepan Gulasekaram 
observe, federal privacy laws, as well as the unique role of universities as 
“institutions . . . tasked with educating and protecting students,” provide 
strong arguments that sanctuary campuses are operating on safe ground.236 
The Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of 
confidential student information to any third party,237 at the risk of 
significant loss of funding,238 and there is no reason to view information 
about immigration status as exempt from this restriction. 
Additionally, because sanctuary campuses (both public and private) 
sometimes provide housing to undocumented students, they too might face 
prosecution for “harboring” undocumented immigrants in violation of 
Section 274 of the INA.239 But liability under this provision seems unlikely 
for a number of reasons. First, although Congress has restricted the access 
of noncitizens to federal educational loans and other governmental benefits, 
 
to Apprehend a 4th-Grader but Was Turned Away by the School, YAHOO! LIFESTYLE (May 14, 2017), 
https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/ice-agent-tried-apprehend-4th-grader-turned-away-school-
224058706.html [https://perma.cc/F6E9-HYQA]. Some schools have now undertaken policies that limit 
ICE’s access to potentially deportable students or their information. See, e.g., Rafi Schwartz, New York 
City to ICE: Stay Out of Our Schools, SPLINTER NEWS (Mar. 22, 2017, 12:36 PM), 
https://splinternews.com/new-york-city-to-ice-stay-out-of-our-schools-1793859239 [https://perma.cc/ 
TFG4-PXA7] (“New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio announced that city school employees have been 
instructed to turn away Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency officials attempting to enter 
school buildings unless they presented a valid, judge-ordered warrant.”). 
 234 See, e.g., No Funding for Sanctuary Campuses Act, H.R. 483, 115th Cong. (2017); H.B. 1042, 
91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (died in committee); H.B. 37, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ga. 2017) (passed); S. Enrolled Act 423, 120th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017) 
(passed); H. File 265, 87th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2017) (introduced); S.B. 4, 85th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 
2017) (passed); Brian Lyman, Alabama House Approves ‘Sanctuary Campus’ Bill, MONTGOMERY 
ADVERTISER (Feb. 14, 2017, 9:46 PM), 
https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/politics/southunionstreet/ 
2017/02/14/alabama-house-approves-sanctuary-campus-bill/97929404 [https://perma.cc/T3RN-H9WR] 
(reporting on passage of a bill that would authorize the state to withhold funds from sanctuary 
campuses). 
 235 See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012) (providing that no law can prevent “any government entity or 
official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information 
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual”). 
 236 Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 31. 
 237 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2012). 
 238 Id. § 1234c(a). 
 239 Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 31. 
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the statute expressly allows states to pass laws that make “an alien who is 
not lawfully present in the United States . . . eligible for any State or local 
public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be ineligible.”240 A 
statutory scheme that permitted universities to openly enroll undocumented 
noncitizens pursuant to a valid state law but then held them criminally 
liable for providing housing to those same students would be exceedingly 
inconsistent, to say the least. On a related score, the Fifth Circuit recently 
observed that, as a general matter, “there is no reasonable interpretation by 
which merely renting housing or providing social services to an illegal 
alien constitutes ‘harboring . . . that person from detection.’”241 For all these 
reasons, one can surmise that the anti-harboring provision would not extend 
to this educational context, although it remains to be seen whether the 
government might nevertheless attempt to prosecute on this basis.242 
IV. THE EQUITY-INFLUENCING DYNAMICS OF SANCTUARIES 
The previous Part described the three main forms of sanctuary that 
have taken hold and showed that each has its own legal and policy 
justifications. This Part defends these resistance measures on more 
systemic grounds. I argue that when federal enforcers fail to exercise 
equitable discretion appropriately in a system that requires prosecutorial 
leniency in order to achieve proportionality and fairness, the locus of this 
discretionary need shifts yet further upstream—to the police, prosecutors, 
public defenders, churches, and other local institutions that encounter 
noncitizens before the federal government has the opportunity to take 
enforcement actions against them. Thus, rather than subvert law, 
noncooperative sanctuary policies—public and private alike—can promote 
legitimacy in the removal system. 
The current executors of the removal system see enforcement targets 
as interchangeable numbers or chits—nameless, faceless others, to be 
eliminated or reduced—rather than individual human beings with unique 
life stories and loved ones. But this way of thinking is a mistake and untrue 
to our better traditions of justice in this country. In a system that 
administers liberty-depriving sanctions like detention and deportation, 
individuals who have built lives in the United States over time should be 
 
 240 See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (titled “State authority to provide for eligibility of illegal aliens for State 
and local public benefits”); id. §§ 1611, 1623(a), 1641 (restricting undocumented persons’ eligibility for 
federal educational loans). 
 241 See, e.g., Cruz v. Abbott, 849 F.3d 594, 602 (5th Cir. 2017) (omission in original). 
 242 See also infra notes 344–46 and accompanying text (arguing that courts should endeavor to 
issue rulings that protect legitimacy-enhancing functions of sanctuaries in the face of government 
attempts to bring harboring prosecutions). 
113:433 (2018) Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation 
481 
able to expect particular, if not categorical, evaluation on equity grounds.243 
High stakes demand commensurate scrutiny, process, and understanding.244 
As in criminal law, immigration enforcement’s “currency is ultimately life 
and death, prosperity and ruin, freedom and imprisonment.”245 
Noncitizens—as human beings living, working, learning, and parenting in 
their communities—are entitled to contextualized consideration of the 
circumstances underlying both the basis of their potential deportation and 
the resulting consequences for themselves, their families, and their 
communities. Seen in this light, equitable discretion is essential to 
“complete justice.”246 
To avoid illegitimate consequences, enforcement determinations must 
consider not solely legality but also normative accuracy.247 As Professor 
Josh Bowers has explained regarding the administration of criminal law, 
legal accuracy “attends to the rules,” while normative accuracy “attends to 
the particulars.”248 Both are essential to the achievement of complete 
justice.249 But when they are in conflict, normative concerns should usually 
prevail.250 Operating in the context of the Trump Administration’s 
indiscriminate, mass approach to immigration enforcement, the efforts of 
sanctuaries are particularly important to the achievement of normatively 
correct results, though they also contribute to legal accuracy and procedural 
fairness in some cases.251 The nature of the legitimacy-enhancing force 
varies with the type of sanctuary measure at issue. The following Sections 
elaborate on these points. 
 
 243 Cf. Bowers, supra note 79, at 212 (“[M]eaningful understanding is not asymmetric. Nor may we 
leave it to sovereign prerogative. We are owed understanding. It is our rightful claim. It is the job of all 
branches of government to deliver it.” (footnote omitted)). 
 244 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976) (holding that as the stakes of the private 
interest affected rise in importance, so too must the procedures to guard against erroneous deprivations). 
 245 Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200, 217 (2012). 
 246 Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1655, 1664 (2017). 
 247 Bowers, supra note 34, at 1019–21. 
 248 Bowers, supra note 246, at 1664. 
 249 Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 93–96 (“Equity may be regarded as a correcting and completing of 
legal justice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Waldron, supra note 245, at 212 (arguing that to 
focus solely on “the clarity and determinacy of rules . . . is to slice in half, to truncate, what law and 
legality rest upon”). 
 250 Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 93 (observing that in Aristotelian accounts of justice, equity is 
superior to “strict legal justice”); Solum, supra note 87, at 194–207 (arguing that “the virtue of justice” 
is superior to strict legal justice). 
 251 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2043 (2006) 
(recounting in a book review an interpretive approach to statutes that “considers the . . . normative 
context for applying the statute,” such that “statutes will not be applied in ways that are unreasonable”). 
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A. Equitable First-Level Screens 
Sanctuary policies that limit cooperation or access for purposes of 
immigration enforcement erect a first-level equitable screen in the removal 
system. Enforcement systems administering sanctions as severe as 
banishment must somewhere afford the capacity to appreciate claims of 
equity, hardship, and mitigation.252 However, criminal court sentencing 
judges and, for the most part, immigration judges no longer have much 
authority to adjust the application of deportation law, even in extremely 
compelling circumstances. At immigration officials’ prerogative, moreover, 
many categories of noncitizens can be denied access to immigration courts 
altogether.253 In the new regime, the gears are fixed, and executive officials 
control the equitable levers. When the eyes of these officials are closed to 
humanity and hardship, they ignore the contextual demands of immigration 
law. In such circumstances, it falls to local and state governments, public 
defenders, police and prosecutors, sentencing judges, and even private 
institutions like campuses and churches to erect equitable screens around 
noncitizens for whom removal would be disproportionate. 
President Trump has described sanctuary city activities as the 
“unlawful nullification of Federal law.”254 But this analogy is imperfect. In 
the criminal context, nullification refers to an ex post decision to ignore 
state evidence presented in a formal prosecution that establishes a 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.255 To be sure, sanctuary 
actions sometimes occur after deportability has already been determined;256 
however, these instances are uncommon. Most often the impact of 
sanctuaries will be further upstream in the process, influencing which 
noncitizens come into contact with federal enforcers in the first place. 
 
 252 Cf. Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 87–88, 92 (explaining why criminal justice systems should 
“refuse[] to demand retribution without understanding the whole story”). 
 253 Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
595, 611–32 (2009) (analyzing the mechanisms that allow the government to remove noncitizens 
without utilizing the immigration adjudication process); Koh, supra note 25 (same). 
 254 Elise Foley & Marina Fang, White House, Trump Attack Judicial Branch Again by 
Misconstruing ‘Sanctuary City’ Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2017, 10:57 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-attacks-court-immigration-sanctuary-cities_us_ 
590098e7e4b0af6d718a2d99 [https://perma.cc/6SUN-T4QB] (reporting that President Trump 
characterized sanctuary city policies as “engaged in the dangerous and unlawful nullification of Federal 
law”). 
 255 Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 253–54 (1996). 
 256 Note also that deportability determinations occur through much thinner processes than those 
afforded criminal defendants, and the government enjoys a significantly more relaxed burden of proof. 
See Cade, supra note 5, at 14–17 (explaining the government’s “clear and convincing” burden of proof 
and other procedural aspects of immigration court). 
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A more apt analogy from criminal law is that of the grand jury. In the 
case of criminal grand juries, “equitable charging discretion is not only 
institutionally acceptable but welcome and anticipated.”257 Although the 
role of subfederal actors in the removal system might at first blush seem to 
be quite distinct from the grand jury’s role in the criminal system, a 
functional closer look reveals key similarities.258 The federal immigration 
system rarely makes its own determination about whether a particular 
noncitizen is actually dangerous or likely to transgress societal norms. 
Instead, the enforcement scheme directly relies on local law enforcement 
actors to determine which noncitizens should be priorities for removal, 
using the proxies of arrest and conviction.259 Thus, local law enforcement is 
already deeply enmeshed in the immigration enforcement scheme.260 
Under the Trump Administration, federal enforcers undertake removal 
measures with precious little consideration of the noncitizen’s character, 
conduct, and contributions. Local police, as well as other local officials and 
institutions such as schools and campuses, thus function as an upstream 
normative screen, determining whom to present and whom to shield from 
federal authorities. In effect, they operate as an equitable grand jury, 
deciding whether immigration enforcement is justified on moral or 
prudential grounds.261 Because the federal government already uses 
subfederal actors to generate what could functionally be described as 
immigration enforcement indictments, it is not a far stretch to acknowledge 
the appropriateness of the subfederal actor’s corresponding role to provide 
an equitable screen in that same context. 
 
 257 Bowers, supra note 246, at 1672; see also Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: 
Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1269 n.19 (2006) 
(noting that “jury nullification . . . criticisms do not readily apply to grand juries, which have the valid 
power to decline prosecution even on meritorious criminal charges”); Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the 
Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 48 
(2002) (“The term ‘grand jury nullification’ is . . . a misnomer because it equates the grand juror’s 
proper exercise of discretionary judgment with a trial juror’s improper decision to acquit those whom 
have been proven guilty.”). 
 258 For explorations of the similarities and differences between criminal and removal systems, see 
Cade, supra note 5, at 54–58; Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., The “Uncivil” Nature of Deportation: Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 34–35 (1978); and 
Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal 
Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 481–82 (2007). 
 259 Cade, supra note 32, at 57; see also Cade, supra note 205, at 365 (“Although either federal or 
state convictions can fall within the INA’s categories of deportable offenses, the federal government 
primarily depends on states and their criminal justice systems to determine in the first instance 
whether . . . immigrants are criminals and therefore deportable under federal law.”). 
 260 Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 39. 
 261 Cf. Bowers, supra note 246, at 1672 (arguing that grand juries should perform an equitable 
function in the criminal context). 
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Local authorities and laypeople may be better positioned to make 
these kinds of equitable determinations than one might initially surmise. 
Proportionality considerations are less about the determination of technical 
culpability than the evaluation of normative principles such as 
blameworthiness, social responsibility, fairness, hardship, and equality.262 
The determination of moral culpability and mitigation “arises out of the 
exercise of human intuition and practical reason, applied concretely to the 
particular offender and his act.”263 Whether the removal of a particular 
noncitizen is socially positive—for the immigrant, his family, and the 
broader community—is a highly contextual consideration. 
Local institutions and entities are more in tune with local context and 
values than federal actors.264 In this respect, police are not solely law 
enforcers; they are also caretakers of their communities. To be sure, 
institutional biases and constraints will always exert influence on decision-
making by police and other law enforcement agents.265 Nevertheless, like 
public defenders, prosecutors, and sentencing judges, police officers likely 
will be more in tune with local social norms and attitudes than technocratic 
lawmakers and federal enforcers, who operate at considerable geographic 
and emotional detachment.266 While local policymakers, police, and 
prosecutors are unlikely to let criminal activity by noncitizens (or anyone 
 
 262 Id. at 1666 (“Laypeople are uniquely well suited to evaluate normative principles, like fairness, 
dignity, autonomy, mercy, forgiveness, coercion, and even equality.”). 
 263 Josh Bowers, Blame by Proxy: Political Retributivism & Its Problems, A Response to Dan 
Markel, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 135, 136 (2012). 
 264 Daniel I. Morales, Transforming Crime-Based Deportation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2017) 
(offering an extended and sympathetic defense of this point); cf. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: 
THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 18 (1994) (“Local jurors . . . know the conscience 
of the community and can apply the law in ways that resonate with the community’s moral values and 
common sense.”); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 
86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1168 (1998) (arguing that local communities are as well-situated as anyone to 
evaluate whether enforcement tactics “embody a reasonable trade-off between liberty and order”); 
Lemos, supra note 95, at 750 (“[S]tate enforcement authority can help match enforcement policy to the 
preferences of local citizens.”). 
 265 For example, local law enforcement agencies rely on state and federal funding sources, whose 
preferences regarding immigration enforcement must be placated or negotiated. See Bowers, supra note 
246, at 1659 (discussing law enforcement biases and institutional constraints that hamper the 
application of equitable principles). See generally Lai & Lasch, supra note 203 (describing the 
dynamics at play when state and local law enforcement accept federal funding). 
 266 This understanding underscores why the loss of the sentencing court remedy of the Judicial 
Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD) was so significant, especially at the moment that 
immigration law broadened the deportation net for noncitizens with a criminal history. The JRAD did 
not require a technical understanding of immigration law. Rather, sentencing judges needed only a 
narrative understanding of individual blameworthiness and mitigation to make a determination that 
deportation was not warranted. See generally Philip L. Torrey, The Erosion of Judicial Discretion in 
Crime-Based Removal Proceedings, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Feb. 2014, at 1, 4–6 (describing the history 
and function of JRADs). 
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else) go unpunished, in sanctuary jurisdictions they may nonetheless 
conclude that in many cases tacking banishment onto the criminal sanctions 
would be a disproportional response. The call is even easier for the 
immigrant with no criminal record whatsoever. Although local police and 
local laws can also be decidedly anti-immigrant,267 the argument that it is 
appropriate for local actors to act as normative grand juries in an era of 
mass immigration enforcement holds even if not all jurisdictions take up 
that responsibility. 
Similarly, by shielding their undocumented students or congregation 
members from detection by the immigration enforcers, sanctuary campuses 
and churches reflect the conscience and ideals of at least a subsection of the 
local community. As organizations with community-based service 
missions, religious organizations and universities are less constrained by 
the institutional incentives and biases that can sometimes hamstring the 
decision-making of law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, they are 
less directly accountable to the public. Still, neither campuses nor 
congregations benefit by alienating their local communities, so their actions 
will either largely accord with local views or reflect a calculated decision 
that the removal of a particular individual would be sufficiently unjust to 
warrant the risk of community friction. 
B. Promotion of Procedural Fairness and Legal Accuracy 
Other sanctuary measures further legitimacy norms at different stages 
of the immigration enforcement process. Churches and cities that provide 
legal screening, attorneys, and other resources to help noncitizens defend 
against removal proceedings, for example, contribute to legally accurate 
and procedurally just outcomes. 
The full administration of the immigration laws requires more than 
attention to its enforcement provisions. The INA also provides for 
 
 267 See generally Cade, Policing the Immigration Police, supra note 78, (discussing police 
departments in North Carolina and Arizona that targeted noncitizens); S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1431, 1437 (2012) (“States and localities are increasingly considering and passing laws that create state 
immigration crimes, enact state immigration enforcement schemes, regulate the renting of property to 
certain noncitizens, penalize businesses for hiring unauthorized workers, and discriminate in the 
provision of public services.”); Rodríguez, supra note 185, at 591–600 (describing a typology of state 
“restrictionist” measures); Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1378–89 
(2013) (same). Empirical data suggest that anti-immigrant laws are largely a function of politics rather 
than levels of immigration or crime rates. PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK 
RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 207–08 (2015) (showing that whether a 
particular local jurisdiction implements anti-immigrant laws is best predicted by the percentage of local 
voters registered as Republican and the presence of an enterprising politician seeking higher office). 
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immigration benefits268 and relief from removal.269 Statutory pathways to 
status and defenses to removal are now quite narrow for undocumented 
persons inside the United States, as I have explained, but those limitations 
make it all the more important that immigration officials take care that 
those who are in fact eligible can access the remaining opportunities.270 
Where a noncitizen is entitled to relief under asylum law, for example, 
agents should help facilitate the claim.271 Just as importantly, enforcement 
 
 268 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012) (concerning adjustment of status categories and procedures). 
See generally WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42866, PERMANENT LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: POLICY OVERVIEW (2014) (stating that in FY2013, 65.6% of the 
noncitizens who became legal permanent residents did so based on family ties); Gabriel J. Chin, The 
Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 274, 297–98 (1996) (discussing how congressional legislation in 1965 
made family reunification a central goal of the INA). 
 269 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (cancellation of removal for LPRs and non-LPRs); id. § 1157 
(refugees), id. § 1158 (asylees); id. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (visas for victims of human trafficking); id. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(U) (visas for certain crime victims); id. § 1101(a)(15)(S) (visas for certain criminal 
informants); id. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (humanitarian parole guidelines); id. § 1254 (temporary protected 
status); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Division B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (codified as 
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30301) (acknowledging deferred action as an appropriate basis for employment 
authorization). 
 270 Cf. Amanda Frost, Cooperative Enforcement in Immigration Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20 
(2017) (suggesting that, as with many other federally regulated fields, immigration officials should 
proactively help eligible noncitizens come into compliance with immigration law); Rachel E. 
Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality, Finality, and the Significance of 
Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 191 (2010) (“It also bears asking whether the government has a 
legitimate interest in deporting those who are not deportable, or in barring from discretionary relief 
those who are eligible.”); Jason A. Cade & Mary Honeychurch, Restoring the Statutory Safety-Valve for 
Immigrant Crime Victims: Premium Processing for Interim U Visa Benefits, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 
ONLINE (forthcoming 2019) (suggesting that USCIS undertake an administrative reform that would 
improve the U visa process for undocumented victims of serious crime who aid law enforcement). 
Notably, when noncitizens are able to take advantage of a statutory means of regularizing their status, 
past immigration transgressions or violations are erased and completely forgiven, in stark contrast to the 
collateral consequences that forever follow a criminal conviction. See Kari Hong, The Ten Parts of 
“Illegal” in “Illegal Immigration” That I Do Not Understand, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 43, 50 
(2017) (“Immigration law’s design is to forgive and forget any violation when remedies are 
available.”); cf. Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and 
the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 755 (2011) (“The status 
imposed by conviction has become increasingly public, the sanctions generated by it have become more 
severe and harder to mitigate, and the number of people trapped in that status—usually for life—has 
ballooned.”). In other words, if a person is able to obtain lawful permanent resident status, they are not 
penalized for previously having overstayed a visa or worked and lived in the United States without 
authorization. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c). Except where the statute sets out specific bars on the basis 
of criminal history or immigration violations, Congress did not intend past infractions to be held against 
individuals who are nevertheless eligible for status or relief. 
 271 Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 723, 727 (B.I.A. 1997) (stating that government 
enforcement agents “bear the responsibility of ensuring that refugee protection is provided where such 
protection is warranted by the circumstances of an asylum applicant’s claim”). Historically, at least, 
attorneys for the agency charged with prosecuting removal were trained to support adjudicatory relief 
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actions and policies should be just and fair, especially in a system that now 
eschews formal back-end proportionality measures.272 Seen in this light, the 
Trump Administration’s equity-blind enforcement approach does not 
conform to the Executive’s proper role.273 It is an approach that makes the 
current immigration scheme less, rather than more, legitimate.274 
Furthermore, the rising use of fast-track mechanisms that bypass 
immigration court altogether portends inadequate process on a large 
scale.275 The concerns about these “shadow” removals include absence of a 
neutral adjudicator, determination of complex immigration issues by 
nonattorneys, failure to provide most of the already limited substantive and 
procedural rights available in regular immigration proceedings, and 
inability to seek judicial review in many cases.276 Without judicial review, 
the federal system lacks the means to correct the errors that inevitably 
result from such weak procedural protections. 
Procedural deficiencies in removal proceedings—particularly with 
respect to fast-track deportation—offend one of the “elementary features of 
natural justice,” which is the adjudicatory norm of “offering both sides an 
opportunity to be heard.”277 For Professor Jeremy Waldron, rule of law 
values include not just settled rules and predictability, but also a true 
opportunity for moral deliberation and argumentation.278 As Professor Tom 
Tyler’s work has shown, “[p]eople want to have the opportunity to tell their 
side of the story in their own words before decisions are made about how to 
 
where legally merited. See Cade, supra note 5, at 23 & n.11 (quoting David Martin, former general 
counsel to both DHS and the INS). 
 272 See generally ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 898–
943 (8th ed. 2016) (discussing due process rights, such as representation by adequate counsel (at no 
expense to the government), opportunities to present evidence, language-access, reasonable 
accommodations for disabilities, and the government’s burdens of proof); Cade, supra note 5, at 22–23 
(discussing procedural protections in immigration court); Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way 
Mirror: Discovery in Immigration Court, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1569, 1575 (2014) (same). 
 273 See Sohoni, supra note 77, at 49 (arguing that enforcement “crackdowns” can resemble 
“lawmaking” more than law enforcing). 
 274 See, e.g., Reid v. INS, 949 F.2d 287, 288 (9th Cir. 1991) (commending the government’s 
immigration prosecutor for conceding error, in light of the principle that “the government has an 
interest only in the law being observed, not in victory or defeat in any particular litigation”); LIPSKY, 
supra note 89, at 15 (arguing that “society seeks not only impartiality from its public agencies but also 
compassion for special circumstances and flexibility in dealing with them”). 
 275 Koh, supra note 25, at 183–84. 
 276 Id. at 194, 222–31. See generally Amanda Frost, Learning from Our Mistakes: Using 
Immigration Enforcement Errors to Guide Reform, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 769 (2015) (arguing that errors 
occur in immigration removal because low-level officials are asked to administer complex and 
ambiguous immigration laws rapidly, without sufficient training or oversight). 
 277 Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 55–56 (2008). See 
generally ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 272, at 946–54 (discussing fast-track removal). 
 278 Waldron, supra note 277, at 5, 8, 58–59. 
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handle the dispute or problem.”279 The Trump Administration’s expansion 
of procedurally stunted rapid removal measures thus implicates both legal 
accuracy and procedural justice norms, which are particularly important 
when something as significant as banishment is on the line. 
Sanctuary measures ensuring that noncitizens enjoy the benefit of 
counsel help combat these procedural threats. Multiple studies have shown 
that attorneys make a critical difference in immigration court outcomes in 
the modern system.280 Represented noncitizens are three to five times more 
likely to prevail, according to several of these studies. Attorneys can help 
noncitizens hold ICE to its burden of proof, contest the accuracy of 
charges, ensure that court appearances are not missed, secure release from 
detention, and help establish eligibility for the remaining forms of relief 
from removal.281 Similarly, when sanctuaries help noncitizens subject to 
summary procedures assert their claims with the help of legal 
representation—or avoid apprehension altogether—they help counter the 
consequences of fast-track mechanisms operating with a high probability of 
error. 
 
 279 Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 30 (2007); see also Bowers, 
supra note 79, at 195 (“[T]he idea of ‘voice’ entails an individual’s awareness not only that her 
reasonable concerns are going to be considered, but also that her reasonable perspective might be 
brought to bear to resolve any ambiguities of law and fact.”). 
 280 See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in 
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (analyzing 1.2 million deportation cases to 
demonstrate that only 14% of detained immigrants were able to secure representation and that 
immigrants with attorneys were 5.5 times more likely to obtain relief from removal); Peter L. 
Markowitz et al., Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal 
Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 363–64 (2011) (reporting a study in which only 18% of 
detained noncitizens with counsel and 3% without counsel were successful in removal proceedings, in 
contrast to a win rate of 74% for nondetained (or released) noncitizens with counsel and 13% without 
counsel); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 295, 340 (2007) (presenting research suggesting that asylum seekers represented by counsel were 
about three times more likely to prevail than those who were unrepresented); Andrea Saenz, The Power 
of 1000: Updates from the Nation’s First Immigration Public Defender, CRIMMIGRATION (July 14, 
2015, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2015/07/14/the-power-of-1000-updates-from-the-nations-
first-immigration-public-defender [https://perma.cc/K24B-CS6P] (“The early data indicate that the 
presence of NYIFUP counsel increases a detained client’s chance of success in their removal case ten 
times over, or by as much as 1000%.”); Representation Makes Fourteen-Fold Difference in Outcome: 
Immigration Court “Women with Children” Cases, TRAC IMMIGRATION (July 15, 2015), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/396 [https://perma.cc/P4TN-CS9M] (finding that women and 
children were more than fourteen times more likely to avoid a deportation order and be permitted to 
remain in the country when represented in removal proceedings). 
 281 See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous Advocacy: Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration 
Litigation, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 475 (2015) (discussing the impact of zealous representation in 
immigration court and calling upon the immigration bar to establish norms of zealous advocacy). 
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C. Last-Resort Circuit-Breakers 
Finally, religious congregations offering shelter to noncitizens facing 
impending removal can act as a last-resort “circuitbreaker in the State’s 
machinery of” injustice, to paraphrase the Supreme Court.282 By providing 
shelter and negotiation on behalf of those for whom formal processes have 
expired, but who nevertheless have compelling legal or equitable claims, 
church sanctuaries disconnect, at least temporarily, the wiring of the 
deportation machine. 
Notably, in a number of cases covered by the media, this kind of 
sanctuary activity has eventually jolted federal authorities into doing the 
right thing.283 Jeanette Vizguerra’s case, with which I began this Article, 
provides an example. To be sure, Vizguerra’s removal was authorized 
under law, although it was not legally required. She had (and continues to 
have) a pending path to lawful status on the basis of having been a serious 
crime victim who assisted law enforcement, among other factors. Although 
there is a lengthy backlog in the adjudication of U applications due to the 
annual statutory cap of 10,000, the agency is authorized to conditionally 
approve any “bona fide” applicant and grant deferred action and work 
authorization in the interim.284 Moreover, the backlog itself has resulted in 
part from the agency’s failure to issue implementing regulations for more 
 
 282 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306–07 (2004). 
 283 See also Mary O’Leary, Undocumented Immigrant Who Took Sanctuary in New Haven Church 
Granted Stay of Deportation, NEW HAVEN REG. (July 26, 2017, 5:36 PM), 
https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Undocumented-immigrant-who-took-sanctuary-in-New-
11729234.php [https://perma.cc/8L7D-VQY5] (describing how a church decision to offer sanctuary to a 
woman living in the United States for twenty-four years resulted in an immigration judge granting a 
stay); Carolina Pichardo, Guatemalan Immigrant Who Took Refuge at Church Granted Stay of 
Deportation, DNA INFO (Aug. 22, 2017, 6:46 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-
york/20170822/washington-heights/amanda-morales-guerra-guatemala-refugee-deportation 
[https://perma.cc/CJ43-AQGC] (“The undocumented Guatemalan immigrant with three young kids who 
last week took refuge at a church on West 179th Street to avoid deportation has been granted a 
temporary reprieve in her quest to remain in the country, officials said.”); Mother from Peru Granted 
Stay from Deportation, BUS. INSIDER (May 21, 2017, 3:48 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-
mother-from-peru-granted-stay-from-deportation-2017-5 [https://perma.cc/AE4W-2GGM] (“A mother 
of two children who sought sanctuary at a Quaker meeting house in Denver to avoid U.S. immigration 
authorities has been granted a temporary stay from deportation.”); Woman Who Took Sanctuary in 
Church Gets One-Year Reprieve, BOS. 25 NEWS (June 11, 2018, 2:28 PM), 
https://www.boston25news.com/news/massachusetts/woman-who-took-church-sanctuary-granted-stay-
of-deportation/767552821 [https://perma.cc/E9JC-X5RZ] (“A woman who took sanctuary in a 
Massachusetts church to avoid deportation to her native Peru has been granted a one-year stay of 
removal by federal immigration officials.”). 
 284 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 214(p)(6), 122 Stat. 5044, 5053 
(2008) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (2012)) (“The Secretary may grant work 
authorization to any alien who has a pending, bona fide application for nonimmigrant status under 
section 101(a)(15)(U).”); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(1)–(2) (2018). See generally Cade & Honeychurch, 
supra note 270. 
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than seven years after Congress first created the U visa.285 Thus, the federal 
government’s failure to devote adequate resources to this form of relief is 
in large part the reason that Vizguerra and tens of thousands of other U 
applicants continue to be present without authorization. Accordingly, the 
efforts of Vizguerra’s church, which eventually resulted in a stay of 
removal until her U visa could be adjudicated, arguably led to a more 
legally accurate outcome. 
But deportation is also normatively unjustifiable in Vizguerra’s case 
because of the tremendous equities in her favor and the hardship that 
deportation would cause to her and her family. By breaking the circuit in 
the deportation machinery and allowing negotiations to continue on 
Vizguerra’s behalf, her unjust removal from the country was averted.286 
D. Spheres of Protected Autonomy 
Sanctuaries also promote other legitimizing norms worthy of 
consideration. One way they do so is by enabling protected autonomy. 
They help guard against unlawful intrusions on the daily lives and lawful 
activities of persons suspected to be deportable (which, of course, 
sometimes includes U.S. citizens287). It is beyond the scope of this Article 
to explore the constitutional rights of noncitizens in detail, but a few 
highlights will help illustrate the role that sanctuaries can play in protecting 
against illegitimate incursions on spheres of autonomy. 
The fact that a person is (or might be) removable from the United 
States on the basis of civil immigration violations or criminal history does 
not extinguish the person’s constitutional right to be free of unreasonable 
searches and seizures or to engage in other lawful life activities. One of the 
most important, but largely overlooked, takeaways from Arizona v. United 
States is what that decision revealed about the Supreme Court’s view that 
even deportable noncitizens should be able to engage in lawful daily life 
activities without fear of unlawful government intrusion in furtherance of 
 
 285 Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 891, 912 (2008). 
 286 Cf. Pichardo, supra note 283 (“‘Amanda is not hiding. Amanda is taking sanctuary and is 
seeking the justice that has been denied,’ Juan Carlos Ruiz, a Lutheran minister and organizer for the 
Sanctuary Coalition, said Monday.”). 
 287 Paige St. John & Joel Rubin, ICE Held an American Man in Custody For 1,273 Days. He’s Not 
the Only One Who Had to Prove His Citizenship, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-citizens-ice-20180427-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/ 
J64N-SY7A] (“But Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents repeatedly target U.S. citizens for 
deportation by mistake, making wrongful arrests based on incomplete government records, bad data and 
lax investigations, according to a Times review of federal lawsuits, internal ICE documents and 
interviews.”). 
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immigration enforcement.288 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority 
emphasized the “significant complexities” of federal immigration law and 
the “immediate human concerns” raised by factors such as “[u]nauthorized 
workers trying to support their families.”289 Throughout its opinion, the 
Court reiterated the principle that noncitizens who are not removal 
priorities under the federal government’s enforcement policies should not 
be subjected to “unnecessary harassment” by state or local officers.290 
Most revealing on this particular point was the Court’s analysis of the 
single challenged state provision to survive preemption—a show-me-your-
papers law allowing state officers to make a reasonable attempt to 
determine the immigration status of persons who have been stopped on 
some other legitimate basis if the officer reasonably suspects the person 
might be unlawfully present.291 The Court made clear the Fourth 
Amendment governs these encounters and that such encounters cannot be 
initiated or prolonged in ways that violate the Constitution, regardless of 
the individual’s underlying immigration status.292 As the Court stated, “it is 
not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States. If 
the police stop someone based on nothing more than possible removability, 
the usual predicate for an arrest is absent.”293 
Similarly, in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court recognized 
noncitizens’ legitimate expectation to be free of Fourth Amendment 
violations by federal immigration agents, even going so far as to require 
immigration judges and federal courts to ignore evidence of an immigrant’s 
removability where it was obtained through enforcement practices resulting 
in either egregious or widespread violations of the Fourth Amendment.294 
 
 288 567 U.S. 387, 406–09 (2012). That case concerned an omnibus law authorizing or requiring 
state actors to engage in various immigration enforcement activities, which the Court largely struck 
down on preemption grounds. Id. at 393–94, 403, 407, 410. See generally Cade, Judging Immigration 
Equity, supra note 31, at 1042–49 (discussing the Arizona decision). 
 289 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396, 409. 
 290 Id. at 408; see also id. at 402, 407, 410. 
 291 Id. at 411–15. 
 292 Id. at 411, 413–14 (citation omitted); see also Cade, Policing the Immigration Police, supra 
note 78, at 189–90 (discussing this aspect of Arizona); Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming 
Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L. J. 125 (2015) (applying Fourth Amendment law to the 
immigration arrest and detainer context). 
 293 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407 (citation omitted). 
 294 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? 
Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 
1624–27 (2010) (same); Elias, supra note 174, at 1115 (discussing this aspect of Lopez-Mendoza and 
arguing that Fourth Amendment violations have now become widespread in immigration enforcement); 
Kagan, supra note 292, at 147 n.159; see also Cade, Policing the Immigration Police, supra note 78, at 
183 (arguing that Executive Branch officials are constitutionally obligated to uphold the Fourth 
Amendment even where the violation is not per se egregious). 
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Subsequently, numerous lower federal courts have elaborated on this 
holding.295 
The freedom of noncitizens—even those present in the United States 
without authorization—to lawfully engage in civic and community life 
emanates from other precedential touchstones, too. In Plyler v. Doe, for 
example, the Court found that parents have a constitutionally protected 
right to send their undocumented children to public school.296 Similarly, the 
Court has limited the authority of states to deny, on the basis of 
immigration status alone, access to other services for which noncitizens are 
otherwise eligible.297 Finally, federal law does not directly prohibit 
undocumented noncitizens from working and expressly authorizes work as 
an independent contractor or business owner.298 
Thus, when immigration agents (or their subfederal deputies) conduct 
home raids and workplace raids that do not adhere to the constraints of the 
Fourth Amendment or engage in enforcement activities in hospitals, 
courthouses, and other places where noncitizens are engaging in or 
assisting with vital community services, these constitutionally protected 
areas of autonomy are threatened.299 The problem is magnified in areas 
 
 295 See, e.g., Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 (4th Cir. 2015); Oliva-Ramos v. 
Attorney Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2012); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 
2006); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 296 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
 297 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that states have “no ‘special 
public interest’” in limiting to citizens the expenditure of tax revenues to which aliens had contributed); 
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (holding that Arizona could not restrict the employment of 
aliens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding that discrimination on the basis of 
immigration status in the application of criminal ordinances violates equal protection). 
 298 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A) (2012) (prohibiting employers from hiring workers without 
federal authorization, but not prohibiting unauthorized work itself); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f) (specifying 
that federal law does not prohibit unauthorized work if done as an independent contractor or business 
owner). See generally Geoffrey Heeren, The Immigrant Right to Work, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 243 
(2017) (providing a historical overview of unauthorized noncitizens’ right to work in this country); 
Jennifer J. Lee, Redefining the Legality of Undocumented Work, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1617 (2018) 
(explaining the current legal landscape regarding unauthorized noncitizens’ right to work). 
 299 See, e.g., Adolfo Flores & Chris Geidner, A DREAMer Was Arrested During a Raid and Now 
Immigration Officials Have Been Ordered to Explain Why, BUZZFEED NEWS (published Feb. 14, 2017, 
8:43 PM; updated Feb. 15, 2017, 7:33 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/adolfoflores/ 
immigrations-officials-ordered-to-defend-arrest-of-dreamer [https://perma.cc/6E82-X7UH]; Michael 
Matza, After ICE Raid at Chesco Mushroom Farm, Anxiety High Among Immigrant Workers, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (May 7, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/ice-raid-mushroom-fear-deport-
chester-county.html [https://perma.cc/7HGZ-W3VR]; Lisa Rein et al., Federal Agents Conduct 
Immigration Enforcement Raids in at Least Six States, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-agents-conduct-sweeping-immigration-enforcement-
raids-in-at-least-6-states/2017/02/10/4b9f443a-efc8-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/55HA-XF7S]; Andrew Selsky, Activist: Immigration Officers Detain 10 Workers in 
Oregon, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 1, 2017), https://apnews.com/88fd12ab02124e17968a8068bc85a3dd 
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where local law enforcement and other authorities work in tandem to turn 
arrests and civic encounters into removal actions wherever possible.300 
Measures limiting local roles in immigration policing guard against 
these incursions. By providing an equitable screen that limits the access 
and information of federal enforcers, these policies enable noncitizens and 
their families to operate within autonomous spaces with less fear of 
unconstitutional (and therefore illegitimate) interference. Within the 
boundaries governed by the particular sanctuary measures, at least, 
noncitizens can operate with certain expectations regarding enforcement 
such that, for the most part, they can continue to engage in the life and 
institutions of the community.301 This relative predictability facilitates the 
human flourishing that underlies the basis for the protection of various 
autonomy interests.302 
Sanctuaries ward against rights violations for U.S. citizens and lawful 
permanent residents (LPRs), too, especially those who do not have white 
European ancestry.303 As a consequence of show-me-your-papers laws, 
local immigration force multipliers, and race-based immigration stops, 
even citizens and LPRs—if they appear Latino—are less able to make 
plans, engage with community institutions, or otherwise carry out their 
lives because of the constant specter of state intrusion on suspicion of 
unlawful presence. Stops based solely on race-based suspicion of unlawful 
 
[https://perma.cc/T3PE-TWPF]; David Wickert, Georgia Immigration Arrests Spark Sharp Responses, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/georgia-immigration-arrests-
spark-sharp-responses/Vy6VksCEdGkgctSQwKB14L [https://perma.cc/MS8T-9VJ7]; see also supra 
note 163 (citing media reports of enforcement actions in courthouses and hospitals). 
 300 See supra notes 170–74, 195–98, 291–93 and accompanying text (discussing joint federal–state 
enforcement efforts and correlations between an amplified local role in immigration policing and 
constitutional rights violations). 
 301 Cf. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 60, at 2039 (“[W]hen prosecutors have enormous 
discretionary power, giving other decisionmakers discretion promotes consistency, not arbitrariness. 
Discretion limits discretion; institutional competition curbs excess and abuse.”). 
 302 Bowers, supra note 79, at 144 (arguing that the ability to “plan[] affairs” without state 
interference is “a tool for self-discovery and expression” and emphasizing that “to know what the state 
may not do is to know not only what I may do but also to ponder and pursue who I am and what I may 
become”); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986) (“The ideal of personal 
autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through 
successive decisions throughout their lives.”); Bezdek, supra note 22, at 917 n.54 (explaining that 
“liberation theologians hold as a central tenet the right and capacity of the common people to become 
active, creative agents of their own history”); Christopher Heath Wellman, Toward a Liberal Theory of 
Political Obligation, 111 ETHICS 735, 738 (2001) (arguing that liberty from state intrusion “implies that 
each autonomous individual has a right to decide which self-regarding benefits to pursue”). 
 303 See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic 
Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1114 (1998) (arguing that our treatment of 
noncitizens affords a window into current racial attitudes more broadly). 
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presence offend bedrock principles of legality and liberty.304 In Professor 
Herbert Packer’s words: “It is important, especially in a society that likes to 
describe itself as ‘free’ and ‘open,’ that a government should be 
empowered to coerce people only for what they do and not for what they 
are.”305 Decoupling immigration from local law enforcement thus can help 
avoid racial profiling and other distortions that arise from the integration of 
the two systems.306 In this way, sanctuaries protect not just the legitimate 
expectations of undocumented residents but also those with citizenship or 
lawful status. 
The efficacy of cooperation-limiting policies in protecting against 
incursions on spheres of autonomy is enhanced where sanctuary 
jurisdictions also have implemented various integrative measures. Some 
jurisdictions, for example, have facilitated noncitizen residents’ access to 
community life by making available driver’s licenses and identity cards. 
Twelve states and the District of Columbia allow all residents who meet the 
requirements to obtain driver’s licenses, even those who are 
unauthorized.307 Because of restrictions posed by the federal REAL ID Act 
of 2005,308 the licenses that most of these states issue to undocumented 
 
 304 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 98 (1968) (arguing that arrests 
“for investigation” or “on suspicion” offend the principle of legality, even where the individual is held 
“only for a few minutes”). 
 305 Id. at 74 (emphasis added). 
 306 See, e.g., Edgar Aguilasocho et al., Misplaced Priorities: The Failure of Secure Communities in 
Los Angeles County, IMMIGRANT RTS. CLINIC, U.C. IRVINE SCH. L. 16–18 (2012), 
http://www.law.uci.edu/academics/real-life-learning/clinics/MisplacedPrioritiesaguilasocho-rodwin-
ashar.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7QZ-2G79] (noting increased racial profiling in policing in Los Angeles 
County following the implementation of the Secure Communities program); Amanda Armenta, 
Between Public Service and Social Control: Policing Dilemmas in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 
63 SOC. PROBS. 111, 121 (2016) (showing with two years’ worth of data that the 287(g) program 
implemented in Nashville, Tennessee led to significant racial profiling and public trust concerns); 
Michael Coon, Local Immigration Enforcement and Arrests of the Hispanic Population, 5 J. ON 
MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 645, 646 (2017) (finding that a 287(g) program in Frederick County, 
Maryland led to a “significantly higher number of arrests of Hispanics by the Sheriff’s Office than 
would have occurred in its absence”); Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial 
Profiling in the ICE Criminal Alien Program, CHIEF JUST. EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY 
& DIVERSITY 1 (2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BLG9-NF3Y] (“[I]mmediately after Irving, Texas law enforcement had 24-hour 
access . . . to ICE in the local jail, discretionary arrests of Hispanics for petty offenses—particularly 
minor traffic offenses—rose dramatically.”); Cade, supra note 47, at 1796–1811 (describing distortions 
in immigration law and criminal law that arise through the convergence of the two systems). 
 307 Adam Hunter & Angelo Mathay, Driver’s Licenses for Unauthorized Immigrants: 2016 
Highlights, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/articles/2016/11/22/drivers-licenses-for-unauthorized-immigrants-2016-highlights [https:// 
perma.cc/R6DN-AEZ7]. 
 308 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2), 109 Stat. 231, 312–13 (codified as 
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2012)) (prohibiting the provision of regular driver’s licenses to 
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noncitizens are visibly distinguishable and limited to state or local use.309 
Nevertheless, when undocumented noncitizens are able to obtain driver’s 
licenses, it can have a “transformative effect . . . , enabling them to drive 
without fear of being stopped by state or local police, arrested, detained, or 
fined, and thereby facilitating their daily access to work, friends, and 
family.”310 The related provision of municipal identity cards to 
unauthorized noncitizens increases access to local services such as police 
assistance, school enrollment, libraries, parking, bank and pharmacy 
accounts, and other community benefits.311 In turn, engagement with these 
institutions can help noncitizens develop ties, equities, and evidence that 
eventually may be valued by formal immigration law.312 
E. Narratives and Norms 
Finally, sanctuaries provide an important voice in the contest of 
narratives about noncitizens and their place in this country. In the view 
expressed (or at least implied) by some sanctuary entities, a mass, 
indiscriminate approach to immigration enforcement harms our shared 
humanity. Some feel that to ignore or accommodate this approach is to 
condone it.313 For others, public safety concerns motivate sanctuary 
efforts.314 To be sure, there may be a gap between a sanctuary entity’s real 
 
undocumented individuals and imposing restrictions on licenses for nonimmigrant visa holders but 
allowing standard licenses for recipients of deferred action). 
 309 Elias, supra note 185, at 835–36 (describing the differences in license design in the states that 
allow unauthorized or conditionally present noncitizens to obtain driver’s licenses). 
 310 Id. at 837; Hiroshi Motomura, Arguing About Sanctuary, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 435, 440 
(2018) (“A driver’s license also greatly reduces the likelihood that a routine traffic stop will trigger an 
immigration status check and possible arrest, detention, and removal — thus a license represents non-
enforcement.”); see also SAMEER M. ASHAR ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE SCH. OF LAW, LEGAL 
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 2016-05, NAVIGATING LIMINAL LEGALITIES ALONG PATHWAYS 
TO CITIZENSHIP: IMMIGRANT VULNERABILITY AND THE ROLE OF MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS 34 (2015) 
(“All residents of Southern California must contend with urban sprawl, but the effects of geographic 
distance were exacerbated by the inability of many undocumented residents to obtain a driver’s license. 
As mentioned previously, A.B. 60, enables undocumented immigrants to secure California driver’s 
licenses, and a large number of our constituent interviewees gave unprompted and unequivocal 
statements about the importance of these licenses in their daily lives.”); Campbell, supra note 189, at 
114 (explaining that in some locations the lack of a driver’s license also frequently leads to the 
impoundment of immigrants’ cars). 
 311 Elias, supra note 185, at 840–41; Campbell, supra note 189, at 114–15. 
 312 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 67, at 111 (“[A]ffiliation arguments grow in strength as 
unauthorized migrants develop ties and make contributions to American society over time.”); Stumpf, 
supra note 141, at 1712–20 (discussing various ways that time is valued in immigration law). 
 313 BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 50 
(2006). 
 314 See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text (explaining the public safety rationale for 
sanctuary city policies and citing examples). 
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and publicly expressed motivations, possibly for strategic reasons. But at 
the end of the day, the underlying impetus is less important than the overall 
effect. All sanctuaries, by visibly resisting the Trump Administration’s 
approach in principled and transparent ways, promote competing norms of 
justice and empathy in the national dialogue.315 
The legitimacy problem created by the failure to implement equitable 
discretion at the federal level is magnified in jurisdictions where local 
enforcers seek to cooperate with (or even expand on) federal immigration 
enforcement priorities. Lack of institutional competition expands the 
possibility of arbitrariness, excess, and abuse. Defensive sanctuary policies, 
on the other hand, constrain federal excess and capriciousness. Thus, 
recognizing the discretion possessed by subfederal actors in this context 
helps counteract immigration law’s growing legitimacy problem. 
“Discretion limits discretion.”316 Moreover, as noted, local actors are at 
least as well-situated to make equitable judgments about persons in their 
community as are detached and geographically distant federal enforcers.317 
Cities, churches, and campuses engaging in sanctuary activities have a 
particular gravitas that lends weight to their dissent.318 Their integral roles 
in the community, as well as the various legal protections they are afforded, 
allow them the independence to assert contrasting views, thereby 
communicating “powerful reminders to community members that anti-
 
 315 See Bezdek, supra note 22, at 913 (“The commitment of the State to its law is indicated by the 
narratives it chooses, but the law of refugees, and the law of citizen conscience unfettered by the 
government’s preferences, are also parts of the construction of legal meaning.”); see also ROBERT 
COVER, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW 95, 98–99 (Martha Minow et 
al. eds., 1992) (“The normative universe is held together by the force of interpretive commitments—
some small and private, others immense and public. These commitments—of officials and of others—
do determine what law means and what law shall be.”). 
 316 Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 60, at 2039. 
 317 See also Cade, supra note 205, at 385–405 (making similar arguments about state-level pardons 
for deportable noncitizens); Cade, Return of the JRAD, supra note 32, at 50 (making similar arguments 
about criminal court JRADs, deferred adjudication, and expungements). To be sure, this claim holds 
most true with respect to macro-level policy decisions by distant technocrats. But as the current 
Administration has tightly constrained the ability of local ICE field officers to defer enforcement on 
equitable grounds, it matters little how well-aligned that local officer might be with the norms of her 
community. See, e.g., Minutes for AILA/ICE Liaison Meeting on October 26, 2017, supra note 158, at 
2 (“On a case-by-case basis in extraordinary circumstances, the Chief Counsel may – with the 
concurrence of the NTA issuing agency (i.e. USCIS, CBP, ICE ERO or ICE HSI) – agree to 
administratively close or dismiss a case.”). 
 318 Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 49 (“These institutions have missions that are meant 
to serve their immediate community, but are also tied to broader responsibilities to the nation, the 
world, and to notions of social justice. . . . For universities, that gravitas comes from long-established 
reputations as research and policy centers with expertise in the field; for churches, it is the moral heft of 
serving vulnerable populations.”). 
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sanctuary views are not consensus perspectives.”319 For law enforcement 
agencies in particular, the fact that they have the authority to help the 
federal government enforce immigration law, but choose not to, endows 
their competing narrative with special clout. 
Conceptualized this way, sanctuary efforts should be viewed not as 
the “demonstrative acts” of civil disobedience but rather as initiatives that 
both implement a more just conception of law and actively reshape norms 
in a longer conversation about immigration policy.320 The resonance of 
sanctuary efforts emanates from a sustained alternative interpretation of 
federal law.321 In Professors Villazor and Gulasekaram’s words, sanctuaries 
are “stakeholders in the project of immigration regulation,” whose policies 
“function as negotiations and contestations with the federal government’s 
current enforcement regime.”322 Law consists of more than rules on 
paper.323 Narratives give the law its meaning, and our shared 
understandings of right and wrong are contingent and dependent upon the 
creative activities of the stakeholders interpreting the law.324 If sanctuaries 
continue to sustain alternative interpretive efforts, and if the stories of the 
sympathetic individuals and families they helped continue to be shared, the 
significance of the movement will transcend equitable results in individual 
cases, ultimately shaping and refining underlying norms and policies.325 
 
 319 Id. (“Moreover, these institutions can couple this heft with the ability – either because of how 
they finance themselves or their constitutional protections – to stand apart from the majoritarian politics 
of their municipality or state. . . . Their reputations in the community enable them to question and 
undermine the legitimacy and desirability of the state’s hard sanctions.”). 
 320 Bezdek, supra note 22, at 973 (making this observation about earlier sanctuary movements); 
Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 52 (explaining that sanctuaries can “serve the critical 
governance functions of norm-creation and swaying public perception”). 
 321 See also Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 56 (“What mostly links these multi-faceted 
sanctuaries – from states to localities and agencies to schools to churches – is not their claim to be the 
final decisionmaker over a jurisdiction, but rather that all of them are registering dissent against the 
current federal administration’s immigration policy.”). 
 322 Id. at 33; see also Bezdek, supra note 22, at 971 (describing the 1980s Sanctuary “Movement as 
a heroic epic, challenging entrenched policies and policymakers with a contrary normative 
understanding, and enabling citizens to insist on changing those policies of exclusion”). 
 323 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983) (“Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law 
becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.”). 
 324 Id. at 4 (“We constantly create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, 
of valid and void.”); see also Susan L. Waysdorf, Popular Tribunals, Legal Storytelling, and the 
Pursuit of a Just Law, 2 YALE J.L. & LIBERATION 67, 68 (1991) (arguing that “legal storytelling can 
provide the nexus between justice-seeking values and the narrative form, within the context of more 
traditional legal discourse”). 
 325 Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Towards a Demosprudence of Law 
and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2749–51, 2759–60 (2014) (describing a collective action 
mechanism they call “demosprudence” through which “mobilized constituencies, often at the local 
level, challenge basic constitutive understandings of justice in our democracy”). 
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Finally, sanctuaries may further legitimacy norms by counteracting a 
growing distrust regarding the ability of the immigration enforcement 
system to achieve just results. As Professor Emily Ryo has shown, the 
experiences of long-term immigrant detainees are leading them to develop 
and disseminate legal cynicism about the legitimacy of the deportation 
system on a widespread basis.326 Those most affected by the system 
perceive the “law in action” to be punitive, inscrutable, and arbitrary.327 
This cynicism is problematic for numerous reasons, not the least of which 
is that it leads individuals to opt out of the legal system altogether, even 
those with meritorious claims.328 To the extent that sanctuary activities 
inject some modicum of fairness and equity into the federal removal system 
and its subfederal criminal law adjuncts, they work against this growing 
legal cynicism, at least on a local level. 
 
*          *          * 
 
When federal enforcers neglect to implement immigration law 
equitably, such concerns devolve further upstream in the removal process. 
As this Part has explained, the local officials and institutions that interact 
with noncitizens before they come into the hands of ICE have the 
opportunity to engage in measures that provide temporary or permanent 
relief in multifaceted ways. Some of these efforts prescreen noncitizens, 
albeit in roughshod fashion, relying on local norms and context to 
determine whom, if anyone, to subject to immigration enforcement. Others 
promote procedural and legal accuracy. Still others break the enforcement 
circuit when there appear to be no other legal options to permit necessary 
reconsideration. Further, sanctuary efforts help enable constitutionally 
protected autonomy, for noncitizens and citizens alike. And finally, these 
efforts help shape the narratives about immigrants and immigration law, 
both locally and on the national stage, in ways that ultimately may result in 
more fairness and proportionality on a macro level. 
 
 326 See Ryo, supra note 42. 
 327 Id. at 1003, 1024–48. 
 328 Id. at 1049; see also id. at 1050–51 (explaining that legal systems that create cynicism impart 
antisocial and anti-rule of law policy messages which can be diffused to wider circles than the affected 
individual). To be sure, this cynicism may in fact be an intentional aspect of the design of President 
Trump’s policies; it may be hoped to be a deterrent for those contemplating illegal (and possibly legal) 
migration. 
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V. SANCTUARY-BASED EQUITY’S LIMITATIONS AND DRAWBACKS 
Sanctuaries are no panacea to the problems of the removal system. 
There are limitations to the manner in which sanctuaries can adjust the 
intensity of federal enforcement. First, and most obviously, sanctuaries will 
only be effective where they operate. Accordingly, the protections provided 
by sanctuary measures for individuals will be inconsistent from place to 
place and nonexistent in many locations. Second, these measures are 
controversial, resulting in political pressures and attempts to restrict federal 
law enforcement grants to sanctuary cities, often generating costly 
litigation.329 Third, the Trump Administration has demonstrated a 
propensity to seek revenge on some sanctuary jurisdictions, surging 
enforcement resources in such areas on at least a sporadic basis, and thus 
potentially overriding the ability of sanctuaries to protect residents of their 
communities.330 
Additionally, it must be acknowledged that in many cases, sanctuaries 
are unable to evaluate the normative justifiability of removability with 
precision. (Resource-intensive sanctuary activities by religious 
organizations may present an exception to this general rule, however.) 
Police, prosecutors, and other subfederal officials must generally rely on 
incomplete information, proxies, and guidelines as they make decisions or 
implement policies that will protect individuals or categories of 
immigrants. For example, many police departments and municipalities with 
sanctuary policies have set noncooperation as the default rule, providing for 
exceptions only where the noncitizen has a significant criminal history. On 
one hand, those carve-outs help justify the view that sanctuary entities 
operate as an equitable grand jury because they will in fact turn an arrestee 
over to ICE where the equities are less obviously sympathetic. For many 
observers, fewer normative concerns are raised when police cooperate with 
federal authorities regarding the removal of noncitizens with serious 
 
 329 See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Enhancing 
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 30, 
2017) (expressing ire against sanctuary cities and a plan to withhold federal funds from them). 
 330 See Statement from ICE Acting Director Tom Homan on California Sanctuary Law, ICE (Oct. 
6, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/statement-ice-acting-director-tom-homan-california-
sanctuary-law [https://perma.cc/32GA-WGZW] (stating that as a consequence of California’s sanctuary 
policies, “ICE will have no choice but to conduct at-large arrests in local neighborhoods and at 
worksites, which will inevitably result in additional collateral arrests”); Bernal, supra note 19; Victor 
Fiorillo, ICE Arrests 107 Immigrants in Philly This Week During “Operation Safe City,” PHIL. MAG. 
(Sept. 29, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/09/29/ice-arrests-107-immigrants-
philly-operation-safe-city [https://perma.cc/LGS7-UPXP]; Rick Ritter, ICE Arrest Hundreds During 
Operation ‘Safe City’ Immigration Crackdown; 28 Arrested in Md., CBS BALT. (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:13 
PM), https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2017/09/29/immigration-baltimore-ice-operation-safe-city-
maryland [https://perma.cc/P58P-SFCG]. 
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criminal records. On occasion, however, these inexact law enforcement 
methods will expose noncitizens who some would believe continue to 
deserve a reprieve or, conversely, aid noncitizens who some would believe 
are undeserving of protection. Thus, the roughshod approach is not ideal, 
but such is the world we live in when formal code law is too harsh and 
static and federal enforcers decline to employ equitable discretion. 
There are at least three additional reasons why these downsides are 
outweighed by the positive functions of sanctuaries. First, unlike jury 
nullification or grand jury refusal to indict in criminal law, sanctuary 
measures do not offer a final veto over federal enforcement decisions. If the 
federal government is determined, in many cases it will eventually be able 
to apprehend the noncitizen and put him or her into removal proceedings.331 
Second, sanctuary efforts largely maintain the status quo. Immigration 
crackdowns and equity-blind enforcement, in contrast, generate significant 
and costly external consequences, including (1) the cost of detention and 
removal proceedings; (2) destruction of family units with long-term effects 
on the health of children and collateral consequences for foster care and 
welfare systems; (3) trepidation about accessing preventative medical care, 
resulting in the unnecessary spread of treatable disease and burdens for 
hospital emergency rooms; (4) loss of workforce; and (5) failure to report 
crime. And for much of this, taxpayers end up footing the bill.332 
Third, when the consequences of an enforcement system are as severe 
as those that result from deportation, the balance should tip toward risk of 
underenforcement, with the heavier burden rightly placed on the 
government.333 Sanctuary entities that decline to assist federal agents in the 
 
 331 See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, U.S. Deports Mother Who Took Sanctuary, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2007, 
3:59 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/21/usa.edpilkington [https://perma.cc/24WU-
FKAY] (reporting on Elvira Arellano, an activist with a U.S. citizen son, who was eventually 
apprehended and deported despite taking church sanctuary in Chicago, Illinois for a year). 
 332 See, e.g., Jana Kasperkevic, Deporting All of America’s Illegal Immigrants Would Cost a 
Whopping $285 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/deporting-all-of-americas-illegal-immigrants-would-cost-a-whopping-
285-billion-2012-1 [https://perma.cc/LAY2-LHL5] (citing sources establishing that deporting one 
noncitizen likely costs the government between $12,500 and $23,480); The New York Immigrant 
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machinery of removal fit within theories of federalism that posit subfederal 
actors as checks against federal tyranny and abuse.334 Increasingly, theorists 
have applied federalism insights to nongovernmental institutions.335 While 
sanctuary policies that run counter to federal enforcement priorities may 
sometimes be overprotective, a system that errs on the side of liberty is 
preferable to one that risks oppression.336 
The dynamics between sanctuaries and the federal government are 
messy, and one should hold no delusion that sanctuaries will precipitate 
consistent justice by any means. But even beyond the short-term individual 
gains that sanctuaries will sometimes achieve, they also play an important 
role in influencing the national dialogue on immigration enforcement 
policy and ultimately may help shape both legislative and judicial activity 
in this area. In the best-case scenario, sanctuaries would help achieve laws 
and enforcement policies that reflect a more humane, family-protective, 
and inclusive vision of which noncitizens should have a right to remain in 
the country. 
CONCLUSION 
A system administering sanctions with consequences for human life as 
significant as banishment and the destruction of family integrity requires 
sufficient play in the joints to account for the particulars of individual 
cases. When Congress excised back-end equitable adjudicatory measures 
from the purview of immigration judges and created mechanisms to 
process certain categories of noncitizens through summary procedures 
lacking basic procedural protections, the responsibility for equitable sorting 
shifted forward to Executive Branch enforcers. To faithfully execute this 
scheme demands fidelity to an individual evaluation of humanity and not 
simply rote adherence to blackletter rules. At the end of the day, a 
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normatively wrong removal is nearly as troubling as one unsupported by 
code law.337 
Disregarding this responsibility, the Trump Administration instead has 
professed a commitment to full enforcement crackdown. In so doing, it has 
failed to live up to the obligation to administer immigration law equitably. 
Sanctuaries have stepped into the resulting equitable void. While critics 
have charged that sanctuary policies subvert law, this Article has argued 
that they present a valid and normatively defensible means of injecting 
legitimacy norms, furthering due process values, and, above all, helping to 
avert at least some disproportionate consequences. 
Thus far there is anecdotal indication that religious sanctuaries 
sometimes nudge the federal government to exercise proper equitable 
discretion.338 When it comes to sanctuary cities, however, the Trump 
Administration has been less accommodating, perhaps because those 
policies shield so many more potentially deportable noncitizens. The 
Administration’s negative reaction is demonstrated by its efforts to 
withhold federal funds from these jurisdictions and occasionally to 
undertake large-scale enforcement activities specifically targeted at their 
residents.339 
The most ideal way forward would be for Congress to roll back the 
severity and sweep of removal provisions and return adjudicative equitable 
discretion to immigration and sentencing judges. While a return to robust 
equitable prosecutorial discretion by federal enforcements represents a 
second-best solution, the truth is that professional enforcers have always 
been an imperfect fit as the primary site for applying law and equity to 
determine the appropriate outcomes.340 Enforcers are typically too busy,341 
and they are primarily tasked with conduct, not adjudication.342 
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Despite the messy and antagonistic milieu in which sanctuaries have 
arisen, they might help point the way to a better future of immigration 
adjudication. Perhaps that future would include a formalized subfederal 
government or community role in recommending against an individual’s 
deportation on normative grounds or even in setting deportation policy 
more generally.343 For now, however, immigration reform remains 
hopelessly gridlocked. Until those gears finally loosen, it falls to other 
actors in the system to shape enforcement in a way that maintains the 
system’s legitimacy. 
Although the Supreme Court’s recent immigration enforcement cases 
do not involve sanctuaries, they nevertheless reveal the Court’s acceptance 
and even endorsement of both federal and subfederal activities that inject 
considerations of fairness and equity into the deportation scheme. Padilla, 
for example, demonstrates the Court’s approval of state and local efforts to 
reduce the possibility of inequitable removals. The lesson of Padilla, 
Arizona, and other cases is critical in the context of thinking about 
sanctuary efforts: equitable discretion, exercised either by enforcers or by 
others who can influence outcomes, is both appropriate and necessary for 
the legitimacy of the current removal system.344 
These considerations might inform courts adjudicating challenges to 
the federal government’s attempts to withhold federal funding from 
sanctuary cities. Courts might also limit the scope of criminal liability 
under the harboring statute in certain situations where sanctuaries provide 
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shelter or other assistance to deportable noncitizens.345 And if situations 
arise in which harboring convictions cannot be avoided, courts might 
nevertheless impose light sentences.346 Through these and related measures, 
courts might protect sanctuary efforts, curb some unfairness in the removal 
system, and signal to the Executive that a reformulation of approach in 
immigration enforcement is required. Ultimately, it may take a combination 
of sustained resistance by subfederal entities and supportive court rulings to 
jolt the political branches into doing the right thing. Until then, sanctuaries 
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